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Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act requires federal agencies to identifr, remove, and replace all references to
credit ratings in their regulations. It responds to longstanding concerns-
heightened by the recent financial crisis-that investors place undue reliance on
the opinions of a small number of eminently fallible (and perhaps fundamental-
ly conflicted) credit rating agencies. At first blush, the approach adopted in § 939A
appears commonsense: if one wishes to reduce reliance on credit ratings, amending
regulations that compel investors to consult credit ratings seems like a straightfor-
ward place to start. This Note reconsiders: what appears straightforward in prin-
ciple has proved to be anything but in practice.
As a targeted critique of § 939A of Dodd-Frank, the Note contend that there
is a fundamental mismatch between Congress's diagnosis and prescription. The
diagnosis was, inter alia, investor overreliance on credit ratings. Section 939A's
prescription, however, was the removal of "any" reference to credit ratings. Sepa-
rating the two is Congress's failure to recognize that overreliance necessarily im-
plies that some level of dependence on credit ratings remains appropriate. The up-
shot of Congress's blunt mandate has been a haphazard (and ongoing) process of
regulatory reform that, where not facially non-compliant with § 939A, rarely up-
holds anything more than its letter. As a broader criticism of federal securities reg-
ulation, the Note argues that this outcome should not be surprising. Section 939A
is afflicted not just by its mismatch between diagnosis and prescription, but also by
a flawed motivating ideal best understood as "mandatory self-reliance," or the be-
lief that independence can be compelled.
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INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) is primarily concerned with "addition" and "increasing."' If Dodd-
Frank's 848-page count does not prove the point, a cursory glance through its
table of contents should suffice: "increasing investor protection" ;2 "increasing
regulatory enforcement and remedies";3 "increased disclosure to investors";4
1. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. Id. at Title IX, § A.
3. Id. at Title IX, § B.
4. Id. § 976.
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"additional oversight of financial regulatory system";' "additional requirements
for certain mortgages";' and not least, an additional regulatory agency.7
Yet Dodd-Frank is not strictly supplemental. Title IX, Subtitle C, § 939A
calls for the removal of certain text from the Code of Federal Regulations. Sec-
tion 939A instructs federal agencies to review regulations for "references to or
requirements in such regulations regarding credit ratings."' After completing
this review, the agencies "shall ... modify any such regulations ... to remove
any reference to or requirement of reliance on credit ratings and to substitute in
such regulations such standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency
shall determine as appropriate for such regulations."9 In brief, § 939A requires
all federal agencies to undertake a three-part exercise of identifying, removing,
and replacing references to credit ratings in their regulations.
The immediate impetus for § 939A, like much of Dodd-Frank, was the
2007 financial crisis. Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are institutions, typically
privately held,10 that perform exactly the function their name suggests: evaluat-
ing ("rating") the creditworthiness of debt securities and their issuers. In doing
so, CRAs mitigate information asymmetries between issuers and investors,
thereby facilitating the exchange or purchase of securities between counterpar-
ties.
Until they do not. CRAs' overoptimistic assessment of the expected per-
formance of mortgage- and other asset-backed securities has frequently been
identified as contributing to (and in one Senate report's view, causing) the re-
cent financial crisis. Scholars and policy-makers have consolidated their criti-
cisms of CRAs under two broad headings. First, they contend that conflicts of
5. Id. § 989E.
6. Id. § 1433.
7. See id. at Title X, "Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection."
8. Id. § 939A(a)(2).
9. Id. § 939A(b).
io. The imprecision of "typically" is necessary due to recent proposals by the so-
called BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to establish a
public CRA that would adopt a more "appropriate" perspective toward the sover-
eign debt issued by developing states, thereby further "bridg[ing] the gap in the
global financial architecture." See Press Trust of India, BRICS Countries Agree to
Set Up Credit Rating Agency, TIMES OF INDIA (Oct. 17, 2016), http://timesofindia
.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/BRICS-countries-agree-to-set-up-credit
-rating-agency/articleshow/54881697.cms [http://perma.cc/S5YT-GYT7].
n1. See STAFF OF UNITED STATES SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS:
COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., WALL
STREET & THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 259 (Comm.
Print Apr. 13, 2011) ("Perhaps more than any other single event, the sudden mass
downgrades of RMBS and CDO ratings were the immediate trigger for the finan-
cial crisis.").
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interest are endemic to CRAs' "issuer-pays" business model.' The majority of
CRAs' revenues stem from fees paid by the issuers of the securities that CRAs
evaluate. 3 Those issuers benefit from higher ratings; so-per their critics-
CRAs inflate credit ratings to secure repeat business. Second, analysts contend
that regulators and investors have outsourced their responsibilities to CRAs.14
Regulators have done so by mandating reference to specific rating levels in their
rules; investors by doing the same in their investment mandates. The upshot is
what international and domestic financial regulatory authorities alike have di-
agnosed as a "mechanistic overreliance" on the opinions of a small number of
eminently fallible (and if the first critique is accepted, fundamentally conflicted)
firms."
Dodd-Frank § 939A targets the latter critique, overreliance, and at first
blush its method appears commonsensical: if one wishes to reduce reliance on
credit ratings, amending regulations that compel investors to consult credit rat-
ings appears a straightforward place to start. This Note reconsiders: what ap-
pears straightforward in principle has proved to be anything but in practice.
As a targeted critique of § 939A of Dodd-Frank, I contend that there is a
fundamental mismatch between Congress's diagnosis and its prescription. The
diagnosis was, inter alia, investor overreliance on credit ratings. Section 939A's
prescription, however, was the removal of "any" reference to credit ratings.
Separating the two is Congress's failure to recognize that overreliance necessari-
ly implies that some level of dependence on credit ratings remains appropriate."
12. See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle,
21 CRITICAL REV. 389, 392-93 (2009).
13. See, e.g., Moody's Corporation, Form 10-Q, Nov. 9, 2017 at 43 (indicating that
Moody's credit rating arm contributes approximately seventy percent of company
revenue); Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 62 (Ya-
suyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds. 2006) (noting that "today roughly 90 per-
cent of credit rating agencies' revenues are from issuer fees"); Bo Becker & Todd
Milbourn, How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings? 1, 11 (Harv. Bus.
Sch. Working Paper No. 09-051, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685691
[http://perma.cc/3825-YXR5].
14. Precisely what those respective responsibilities are varies by commentator. As a
general matter, however, analysts call for regulators and investors to perform their
various functions with greater independence from CRAs.
15. See, e.g., Revisions to the Standardised Approach for Credit Risk, BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION (Dec. 2015); Joint Consultation Paper on Mechanistic Refer-
ences to Credit Ratings in the ESA's Guidelines and Recommendations, EUROPEAN
BANKING AUTHORITY JOINT COMM. OF THE EUROPEAN SUPERVISORY AUTHORITIES
(Nov. 7, 2013); FIN. STABILITY BD., PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRA
RATINGS (Oct. 27, 2010); FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING MECHANISTIC RELIANCE ON
CREDIT RATING AGENCY RATINGS: AUSTRALIA'S ACTION PLAN (Mar. 2014).
16. To make the point more concrete: if Congress applied the same logic to combat-
ting obesity, it would require everyone to stop eating.
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The upshot of Congress's blunt mandate has been a haphazard (and ongoing)
process of regulatory reform that, where not facially non-compliant with
§ 939A, rarely upholds anything more than its letter.
As a broader criticism of federal securities regulation, I contend that this
outcome should not be surprising. Section 939A is afflicted not just by its mis-
match between diagnosis and prescription, but also by a flawed motivating ideal
best understood as "mandatory self-reliance," or the belief that independence
can be compelled. Mandatory self-reliance is not necessarily an oxymoron. We
can readily imagine circumstances in which self-sufficiency in fact requires mo-
tivation. 7 On efficiency and related grounds, this Note argues that sophisticated
financial transactions are not one of them.
The remainder of the Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces CRAs,
describing their origins and functions before discussing their failures during the
2007 financial crisis. It then reviews the most prominent international regulato-
ry responses in order to indicate the context and impetus for Congressional ac-
tion in § 939A of Dodd-Frank. Part II begins by discussing the implementation
of § 939A throughout the executive branch before focusing on the Securities
and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) extended attempt to remove CRA refer-
ences from Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, the SEC's central provi-
sion regulating money market fund (MMF) investments.
Part III turns from exposition to analysis, arguing that the SEC's revisions
to Rule 2a-7 are representative of § 939A's failings as a whole. Congress's cate-
gorical approach-mandating the removal of "any" references to credit ratings
despite seeking to remedy overreliance-is likely to have increased ambiguity
and cost without a corresponding reduction in regulators or investors' depend-
ence on credit ratings. Moreover, § 939A may undermine related provisions in
Dodd-Frank that seek to reduce the conflicts of interest associated with CRAs'
"issuer pays" business model. Part IV considers counterarguments and poten-
tial paths forward. One path follows the more pragmatic and experimental ap-
proach taken by authorities in the European Union (EU). An alternative path,
entailing a more fundamental reassessment of the project of moderating inves-
tor reliance on CRAs, concludes.
I. THE FUNCTIONS, ORIGINS, AND FAILURES OF CRAs
This Part begins by describing functional explanations for the existence of
CRAs. The second Section then briefly reviews the introduction of references to
credit ratings and CRAs in U.S. regulations. The final Section discusses CRAs'
role in the 2007 financial crisis and the beginnings of the international regulato-
ry response.
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17. For example, much like the baby bird, the college graduate may only learn to fly
after being tossed from the "nest."
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A. Functions
Credit ratings mitigate a problem endemic to all market exchanges: trust."
Once markets encompass strangers, members of different linguistic or religious
communities, or parties that do not have recourse to a shared means of dispute
resolution, trust becomes a central precondition for non-instantaneous ex-
changes such as lending.19 Various communities and industries have devised re-
sponses-from merchant guilds, to religiously observant middlemen, to the
formation of a lex mercatoria.2 0
The trust deficit that inspired the creation of CRAs is often more specifical-
ly described as an information asymmetry.' Applied to the relationship be-
tween the issuers of debt securities and potential investors, the asymmetry is a
version of the familiar "lemon" problem." Institutional lenders such as banks
typically address such asymmetries through initial credit screening and ongoing
monitoring of borrowers' finances. Smaller lenders and individual investors of-
ten lack the resources to perform such assessments for even the most "vanilla"
debt. More complex debt products such as asset-backed securities, which often
package together thousands of individual loans, may be beyond the credit
screening capacities of even the largest institutions. CRAs serve small and large
lenders/investors alike by assessing the creditworthiness of issuers and/or indi-
vidual securities and assigning a score indicating their relative risk of default.
Credit rating agencies thereby promote the efficient distribution of capital, ena-
bling investors to allocate capital with greater precision pursuant to their risk
preferences.
So much for the standard account. Among the leading alternative theories,
some analysts have suggested that the principal function of CRAs is instead to
provide investors with a third-party (and if the fund manager references a credit
score pursuant to a regulatory requirement, also a governmental) stamp of ap-
18. Trust is implicit-and for the etymologically minded, explicit-in the term "cred-
it" itself. "Credit" derives from the Latin credere, meaning to believe or entrust.
Credit. Origin and Etymology of Credit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www
.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/credit [http://perma.cc/4MGR-VGKA].
19. A "non-instantaneous exchange" simply refers to a transaction in which one party
pays today and the other (re)pays sometime later. The important feature of this
exchange, for present purposes, is that the former party must trust that the latter
will perform.
20. Known in English as the "Law Merchant." See generally J. H. Baker, The Law Mer-
chant and the Common Law before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295 (1979).
21. See, e.g., Arnoud Boot et al., Credit Ratings as Coordinated Mechanisms, 19 REV.
FIN. STUD. 81 (2006); Yair Listokin & Benjamin Taibleson, If You Misrate, Then
You Lose: Improving Credit Rating Agency Accuracy Through Incentive Compensa-
tion, 27 YALE J. REG. 91 (2010).
22. George A. Akerloff, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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proval for their decisions. 3 According to this account, the financial information
that CRAs provide is of secondary importance to the reputational signal their
ratings send. Alternative theories focus on the role of CRAs in systematizing
and organizing extensive and often disparate financial information. Analysts
subscribing to this view maintain that in financial markets awash with data, the
primary value of CRAs is in consolidating this information into a single, com-
prehensible, and communicable credit score. 5 Still other analysts argue that
modern CRAs serve no function at all," and are merely a relic of misguided
regulatory decisions at a time when investors lacked access to reams of financial
information and analysis with the stroke of a few keys. Well into the 21st centu-
ry, these alternative (non)functional accounts attracted relatively few adherents.
After the 2007 financial crisis, however, the critics appeared Cassandras.2 7 The
next Section sets the stage for the 2007 crisis by reviewing the origins and ex-
pansion of the rating industry as well as the introduction of references to credit
ratings and CRAs by U.S. regulators.
23. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH U. L. Q 619 (1999); see also Thomas
McGuire, Executive Vice President, Moody's, "Ratings in Regulation: A Petition
to the Gorillas," Address at the SEC Fifth Annual International Institute for Secu-
rities Market Development (Apr. 28, 1995) ("By using securities ratings as a tool
of regulation, governments fundamentally change the nature of the product agen-
cies sell. Issuers then pay rating fees to purchase, not credibility with the investor
community, but a license from a government."), quoted in Viktoria Baklanova,
Regulatory Use of Credit Ratings: How It Impacts the Behavior of Market Constitu-
ents, in CREDIT, CURRENCY, OR DERIVATIVES: INSTRUMENTS OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY 92 (J. Jay Choi & Michael G. Papaioannou eds., 2009).
24. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist, 44 ECON. NOTES 161,
171-73 (2015) ("Rating agencies are institutions necessary for a more efficient
market in which available information is centrally processed at cheaper cost than
on a disaggregated basis at higher labour costs" and comparing agencies to librar-
ies that "produce little new information" but "collect and organise information
for the benefit of research by others.").
25. For the visual learner, picture reducing a spreadsheet with tens of thousands of
entries into the letter "A."
26. Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L
& Bus. REv. 10, 21 (2006) ("It is generally accepted that the uninformed investors
who inhabit financial markets clearly rely on the ratings generated by the major
credit rating agencies. Why this is the case is something of a mystery.").
27. See Cassandra, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/
Cassandra-Greek-mythology [http://perma.cc/ZQ69-M56R].
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B. Origins
Lewis Tappan was already a notoriously strict judge of character when he
joined his brother's silk business in New York in the mid-19th century.2" Along
with learning the trade, Tappan spent much of his time maintaining meticulous
records of the firm's finances and the debts it was owed by counterparties. 9
These records proved invaluable to Tappan and colleagues throughout the New
York silk trade during the panic of 1837. With business still depressed in 1841,
Tappan sought to develop an alternative revenue stream.30
Drawing upon a network of contacts in the abolitionist movement, Tappan
established The Mercantile Agency.31 By 1844 the Agency had branches in Bos-
ton, Philadelphia, and Baltimore; by 1851, two thousand full-time correspond-
ents were investigating the creditworthiness of firms in various industries across
the country.32 Competition from established commercial reporting firms such
as Standard and Poor's Publishing soon followed.33
The first reference to a credit rating in U.S. regulatory text followed the
stock market collapse that began the Great Depression. Federal securities regu-
lators' responses were driven by two main ambitions. First, they sought a means
of encouraging the growing number of retail investors to place their capital with
more "stable" banks and other financial firms. Second, they wanted to impose
stricter restrictions on the investment practices of institutions whose mass de-
28. Both Lewis and his brother were staunch evangelical Christians, known in the
neighborhood for distributing bibles outside their store and entering into brothels
to "pluck fallen women from roaring lions who seek to devour them."
Lewis Tappan, PBS: WHO MADE AMERICA, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
theymadeamerica/whomade/tappanjhi.html [http://perma.cc/7GUD-SYB8]; see
also LEWIS TAPPAN, THE LIFE OF ARTHuR TAPPAN (1870).
29. See Lewis Tappan, PBS, supra note 28.
30. Id.
31. The Mercantile Agency is the corporate predecessor of Dun & Bradstreet, a com-
mercial data firm listed on the New York Stock Exchange boasting data on more
than 285 million companies worldwide. See Our Worldwide Network,
DuN & BRADSTREET (last visited on Apr. 11, 2018), http://www.dnb
.com/about-us/our-worldwide-network.html [http://perma.cc/BB5M-CQZL].
32. See Lewis Tappan, PBS, supra note 28; NICOLA JENTZSCH, FINANCIAL PRIVACY: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS 63 (2006); BERTRAM
WYATT-BROWN, LEWIS TAPPAN AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR AGAINST SLAVERY
(1969).
33. See Our History, S&P GLOBAL, http://www.spglobal.com/who-we-are/our-
company/our-history [http://perma.cc/5SSL-3WMT] (last visited Apr. 11, 2018)
(noting that in 1860 Henry Varnum Poor published an investor's guide to the
U.S. railroad industry that "provideld] essential insights into the railroad industry
and help [ed] investors leverage that intelligence into smart investment deci-
sions").
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faults exacerbated the crisis. 34 Mandating that institutional lenders refer to cred-
it ratings advanced both goals, and in 1936 the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) for the first time required banks to apply distinct accounting
treatments for "speculative" and "investment grade" bonds. The OCC defined
the latter with reference to "recognized rating manuals," such as that issued by
Standard and Poor's.35
References to credit ratings in federal regulations remained relatively sparse
until 1975. That year, the SEC introduced the term "nationally recognized sta-
tistical rating organization" (NRSRO) into its rules detailing net capital re-
quirements for broker-dealers.36 The SEC sought to establish a "reasonably ob-
jective" benchmark for assigning capital charges to various debt instruments,
and it described the NRSRO designation as a means of ensuring such objectivity
by privileging the ratings of the most reliable and accurate CRAs.37 The ratings
provided by CRAs that gained NRSRO status received, in effect, a governmental
stamp of approval.
Regulatory references to credit ratings soon proliferated, with "investment
grade" and analogous citations serving as convenient shorthand for the finan-
cial safety and security that is a central component of various regulators' man-
dates.38 By 1997, more than one thousand securities regulations referenced
34. ALINE DARBELLAY, REGULATING CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 17-23 (2013).
35. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, PURCHASE OF INVESTMENT SECURITIES AND
FURTHER DEFINING THE TERM 'INVESTMENT SECURITIES' AS USED IN SECTION 5136
OF THE REVISED STATUTES AS AMENDED BY THE 'BANKING ACT OF 1935' (Feb. 15,
1936); see also Standard and Poor's Corporate Ratings Criteria 9 (2001), cited in
Steven L. Schwacz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7-8.
36. See SEC, NOTICE OF REVISION PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 15C3-1 UNDER THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973), Release No 34-10,525, 1973 SEC
LEXIS 2309; see also 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1 (July 16, 1975).
37. See Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed.
Reg. 21,306, 21,311 (proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240);
SEC, NOTICE OF REVISION PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 15C3-1 ("The Com-
mission to a limited extent has also recognized the usefulness of the nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations as a basis for establishing a dividing line
for securities with a greater or lesser degree of market volatility.").
38. Discussing the history of the concept in a 2005 proposed rule, the SEC noted that
it had utilized the term in the following regulations: "17 CFR 228.10(e), 229.10(c),
230.134(a)(14), 230.436(g), 239.13, 239.32, 239.33, 240.3al- 1(b)(3), 240.10b-
10(a)(8), 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(E), (F), and (H), 240.15c3-la(b)(1)(i)(C),
240.15c3-1f(d), 240.15c3-3a, Item 14, Note G, 242.101(c)(2), 242.102(d),
242.300(k)(3) and (1)(3), 270.2a-7(a)(10), 270.3a-7(a)(2), 270.5b-3(c), and
270.10f-3(a)(3)." The Commission goes on to note that Congress has also found
the concept useful, incorporating the term NRSRO into diverse legislation, in-
cluding:
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NRSROs. Another 1,200 references appeared in regulations addressing banking,
real estate, and pensions. 39
The proliferation of references is partly a function of the expanding size
and complexity of credit markets. Yet volume alone tells an incomplete story.
Defining vague regulatory ambitions such as "financial safety" and "investment
security" with reference to credit ratings assigned by CRAs advanced regulatory
and investors' interests alike. Echoing the critics discussed above, however, this
may be because it absolved both of responsibility.
C. Failures
In 2003, the SEC consulted industry participants concerning its references
to credit ratings. Many respondents-including some credit agencieS 4 -argued
that the SEC should remove the references entirely. The majority argued that
before taking such a step the SEC was obliged to identify a viable alternative.
Seeing none, the SEC took no action.
The force and urgency of the critiques noted above multiplied after the
2007 financial crisis. 41 Analysts and policy makers identified CRAs' overoptimis-
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(41) (defining the term "mortgage related security"); 15
U.S.C. 78c(a)(53)(A) (defining the term "small business related
security"); 15 U.S.C. 80a-6(a)(5)(A)(iv)(I) (exempting certain companies
from the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940); Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 (1999); Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178 (1998); Reigle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
325 (1994); Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553
(2000); Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325
(1992); Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-550 (1992); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242 (1991); and Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforce-ment Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-72 (1989).
See Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 70 Fed.
Reg. 21,306 (proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) at nn.5,
11.
39. Global Financial Stability Report: Sovereigns, Funding, and Systemic Liquidity, INT'L
MONETARY FUND 92 (Oct. 2010), http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR Is-
sues/2016/12/3 1/Sovereigns-Funding-and-Systemic-Liquidity [http://perma.cc/
E93Q-XEX9].
40. See, e.g., Moody's Investment Service, Comment Letter on File No. S7-12-03 Con-
cept Release: Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal
Securities Laws (July 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s712O3/
moodys072803.htm [http://perma.cc/5XZF-XPWR] ("If ratings cease to be used
for regulatory purposes, we believe that credit rating agencies can continue to
serve their primary objectives in support of market efficiency and investor protec-
tion.").
41. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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tic assessments of mortgage-backed securities as a principal cause of the infla-
tion and collapse of the U.S. housing bubble. 42 The causal account is damning43:
inaccurate credit ratings supported the sale of "toxic" securitized mortgage
products to investment funds. Because the funds and the issuers of the products
benefited from these transactions, demand for the underlying loans increased,
encouraging lenders to lower their credit standards in order to ensure adequate
supply. The upshot, "when the music stop[ped],"44 was an economy-wide crisis
comparable to the Great Depression.
Just as the stock market crash of 1929 brought about the first regulatory
reference to credit ratings, so the 2007 crisis appeared to herald the demise of
the practice. In April 2008, the Financial Stability Forum-an institution com-
prising national authorities responsible for financial stability in the G7 coun-
tries, succeeded in 2009 by the Financial Stability Board (FSB)-issued a report
calling for national regulators to curtail investors and regulators' reliance on
credit ratings.45 Principle IV.8 of the FSB's "Report on Enhancing Market and
Institutional Resilience" called for national regulators to "check that the roles
that they have assigned to ratings in regulations and supervisory rules are con-
sistent with the objectives of having investors make independent judgment of
risks and perform their own due diligence, and that they do not induce uncriti-
cal reliance on credit ratings."46
42. See, e.g., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRisis, supra note 11, at 289-94.
43. It is also popular. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reforms: The Good, The Bad
and The Ugly, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 231, 236-46 (2011); Kia Dennis, The Ratings
Game: Explaining Rating Agency Failures In The Build Up to the Financial Crisis, 63
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1111, 1122-23 (2009); Elizabeth Devine, The Collapse Of An
Empire? Rating Agency Reform in the Wake of the 2007 Financial Crisis, 16
FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 177, 178 (2011) ("As analysts begin to investigate who
is to blame for the current financial situation, some argue it was the fault of over-
zealous lenders, others say that homeowners were simply borrowing well beyond
their means, but many analysts now point fingers at the rating agencies them-
selves.").
44. The now-infamous quote comes from then-chief executive of Citigroup, Chuck
Prince, who in a July 2007 interview told the Financial Times that "when the mu-
sic stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music
is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing." Michiyo Nakamo-
to & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-outs, FIN.
TIMEs (July 9, 2007), http://www.ft.com/content/80e2987a-2e50-1ldc-821c-
0000779fd2ac [http://perma.cc/PBB2-E5MK].
45. Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Re-
silience, FIN. STABILITY FORuM 32-40 (Apr. 7, 2008), http://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_0804.pdf [http://perma.cc/6THV- PKUD].
46. Id. at 38.
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Two years later, the FSB published its "Principles for Reducing Reliance on
CRA Ratings." 47 The FSB consolidated its recommendations into two general
principles designed to serve as a framework for domestic reforms. Principle I
calls for reducing reliance on CRA ratings in standards, laws, and regulations.4
In particular, it instructs domestic authorities to identify references to CRAs in
their regulations and, "wherever possible, remove them or replace them by suit-
able alternative standards of creditworthiness." 49 Principle II extends to the pri-
vate sector, calling for "banks, market participants and institutional investors to
make their own credit assessments, and not rely solely or mechanistically on
CRA ratings."o5 The Bank for International Settlements," the International Or-
ganization of Securities Commissions,' and other multilateral regulatory insti-
tutions (including the International Monetary Fund,53 United Nations,5 4 and
World Bank") have expressed support for the FSB's approach.
In between these two FSB initiatives, the United States had its own say on
the matter. Title IX, Subtitle C of Dodd-Frank addresses "Improvements to the
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies."56 Its nine sections target the two princi-
pal critiques of CRAs levied after the crisis: regulators' and investors' overreli-
ance on credit ratings, and conflicts of interest associated with CRAs' "issuer
pays" business model.5 7 Overreliance is the focus of §§ 939 and 939A. Section
939 mandates the removal of specific references to credit ratings in various stat-
47. Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings, FIN. STABILITY BD.
(Oct. 27, 2010), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r-101027.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2GCS-LR7Y].
48. Id. at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2.
51. See Revisions to the Standardised Approach for Credit Risk, BANK INT'L
SETTLEMENTS 4 (Dec. 2015), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d347.pdf [http://perm
a.cc/LA8V-CW9P].
52. See Sound Practices at Large Intermediaries: Alternatives to the Use of Credit Ratings
to Assess Creditworthiness, INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS (Dec. 2015)
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD524.pdf [http://perma.cc/
P9YU-ZJRG].
53. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 39, at 85-122.
54. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Examines Growing Role
of Credit Rating Agencies as Arbiters of Risk, While Speakers Call for Common
Standards, Objectivity, Reforms, U.N. Press Release GA/11409 (Sept. 10, 2013).
55. Jonathan Katz et al., Credit Rating Agencies: No Easy Regulatory Solutions, WORLD
BANK GROUP: CRISIs RESPONSE POLICY BRIEF 6 (Oct. 2009).
56. Pub. L. No. 111-203 at Title IX, § C.
57. Id. §§ 931-939(A)-(H).
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utes;58 Section 939A orders that federal agencies complete the same exercise for
all of their regulations. 9
The following Part first analyzes § 939A's mandate and its implementation
across the executive branch before turning to the SEC's five-year attempt to re-
move references to credit ratings from Rule 2a-7, the Commission's primary
rule governing MMFs. I thereby set out the empirical foundations for the analy-
sis that follows in Part III.
II. DODD-FRANK § 939A
A. Text and Implementation
Section 939A mandates that federal agencies identify, remove, and replace
regulatory references to credit ratings. First, it instructs that each federal agency
"shall," within one year of the date of enactment, review "(1) any regulation is-
sued by such an agency that requires the use of an assessment of the credit-
worthiness of a security or money market instrument; and (2) any references to
or requirements in such regulations regarding credit ratings."o Second, each
agency "shall modify any such regulations ... to remove any reference to or re-
quirement of reliance on credit ratings"-a notable departure from the FSB's
call to remove such references "wherever possible."" Third, each agency
"shall ... substitute in such regulations such standard of credit-worthiness as
each respective agency shall determine as appropriate for such regulations."1S6
The dictate to remove statutory references to credit ratings was first con-
templated by the House Financial Services Committee pursuant to an amend-
ment introduced by Representatives Scott Garrett and Spencer Bachus to the
Accountability and Transparency in Rating Agencies Act, a bill that never re-
ceived a vote in the House.63 Some components of the Accountability Act, in-
cluding its tenth section, "Review of Reliance on Ratings," nonetheless later
58. E.g. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. 114-113, § 28(d), 64 Stat. 873 (codi-
fied as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 1811 et seq. (2015)) (removing "not of investment
grade" and inserting "that does not meet standards of credit-worthiness as estab-
lished by the Corporation").
59. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010)
("Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this subtitle, each Feder-
al agency shall.. .modify any such regulations... to remove any reference to or
requirement of reliance on credit ratings.").
60. Id. § 939A(a)(1)-(2).
61. Id. § 939A(b).
62. Id.
63. See Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Bachus, Garrett Amendment to
Reduce Reliance on Credit Ratings Approved by Committee (Oct. 27, 2009),
http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=2278
24 [http://perma.cc/PR58-3NHY]; H. REP. No. 111-685 (2010).
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made their way into the text of Dodd-Frank following further drafting by Gar-
rett, Bachus, and Dodd-Frank's co-sponsor, Representative Barney Frank.6 4
During a 2012 Committee on Financial Services hearing, Garrett described the
impetus for the provision as "broad agreement that investors, because of the
government's explicit requirement of ratings, had become basically over-reliant
on the rating agencies and failed to do their due diligence."6 '
The Congressional response to investors' overreliance on credit ratings was
logical, if blunt: in lieu of the FSB's discretionary "wherever possible," § 939A
instructs the agencies to "remove any reference." A full review of its implemen-
tation is beyond the scope of this Note.66 For present purposes, it is adequate to
develop a general sense of the diversity of approaches. The ensuing discussion
of the SEC's efforts to reform rule 2a-7 will then provide the empirical depth
needed to support Part III's normative analysis.'
The following tables review a sample of the implementation strategies pur-
sued by five federal agencies. Each table's second and third columns compare
the language of targeted regulations before and after the agency deemed itself
compliant with § 939A. Italicized text indicates the relevant amendment, or lack
thereof. Following each table, I briefly highlight salient aspects of the process or
result.
64. See Oversight of the Credit Rating Agencies Post-Dodd-Frank: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 5 (July 27, 2011) (statement of Rep. Garrett, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs.) ("Ranking Member
Frank, Chairman Bachus and I crafted language to remove all rating requirements
from the statutes and the regulations. So, I am pleased to see that in some regards,
the regulatory community has been moving forward on implementing that.").
65. Id.; see also Oversight of the Credit Rating Agencies Post-Dodd-Frank: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serys.,
supra note 64 (statement of Rep. Fitzpatrick, Vice Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Servs.) ("I think it is striking
that one of the few bipartisan understandings to come out of Dodd-Frank was
that reliance on credit ratings have become too ingrained and too pervasive in our
statutes.").
66. Those seeking a review focusing on how federal agencies may or may not have
learned from each other's efforts in implementing § 939A should consult Frances-
co De Pascalis's thorough study. Francesco De Pascalis, Reducing Regulatory Reli-
ance on Credit Ratings to Address Investors' Over-reliance: Some Thoughts in Light
of the US Experience, 11 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 510 (2016).
67. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
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17 C.F.R. § 1.49: Denomi-
nation of customer funds
and location of depositories.
(d) Qualifications for de-
positories
(3) A depository, if located
outside the United States,
must be:
(i) A bank or trust compa-
ny:
(A) That has in excess of $1
billion of regulatory capital;
or
(B) Whose commercial pa-
per or long-term debt in-
strument or, if a part of a
holding company system, its
holding company's commer-
cial paper or long-term debt
instrument, is rated in one of
the two highest rating catego-
ries by at least one nationally
recognized statistical rating
organization;
(ii) A futures commission
merchant that is registered
as such with the Commis-
sion; or ... .
17 C.F.R. § 1.49: Denomi-
nation of customer funds
and location of deposito-
ries
(d) Qualifications for de-
positories
(3) A depository, if located
outside the United States,
must be:
(i) A bank or trust compa-
ny that has in excess of $1
billion of regulatory capi-
tal;
(ii) A futures commission
merchant that is registered
as such with the Commis-
sion; or . . ..
The CFTC completed the first (investigation) and second (removal) steps
mandated by § 939A. Note, however, that Rule 1.49 does not provide an alter-
native measure of creditworthiness to replace the previous reference to NRS-
ROs. It thus does not, as required, "substitute in such regulations such standard
68. 17 C.F.R. § 1.49(d)(3)(i)(B) (2009) (emphasis added).
69. Id. at § 1.49(d) (2).
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Regulator Pre § 939A Post § 939A
Commodities
Futures Trading
Commission
(CFTC)
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
of credit-worthiness as [it] determine[s] . . . appropriate for such regulations."70
That said, the CFTC could argue that the "substitute" it has determined is most
appropriate is no standard at all.
Regulator Pre § 939A Post § 939A
Office of the
Comptroller of
the Currency
(OCC)
12 C.F.R. § 28.15: Capital
equivalency deposits
For purposes of section 4(g)
of the IBA, 12 U.S.C.
3102(g), unless otherwise
provided by the OCC, a for-
eign bank's capital equiva-
lency deposits
(CED) must consist of:
(iii) Certificates of deposit,
payable in the United States,
and banker's acceptances,
provided that, in either case,
the issuer or the instrument is
rated investment grade by an
internationally recognized
rating organization, and nei-
ther the issuer nor the in-
strument is rated lower than
investment grade by any such
rating organization that has
rated the issuer or the in-
strument. 71
12 C.F.R. § 28.15: Capital
equivalency deposits
For purposes of section 4(g)
of the IBA, 12 U.S.C.
3102(g), unless otherwise
provided by the OCC, a for-
eign bank's capital equiva-
lency deposits
(CED) must consist of:
(iii) Certificates of deposit,
payable in the United States,
and banker's acceptances,
provided that, in either case,
the issuer has an adequate
capacity to meet financial
commitments for the project-
ed life of the asset or expo-
sure. An issuer has an ade-
quate capacity to meet
financial commitments if the
risk of default by the obligor
is low and the full and timely
repayment of principal and
interest is expected. 72
The OCC's revision provides an alternative metric for creditworthiness-
"adequate capacity to meet financial commitments"-to replace previous refer-
ences to "internationally recognized rating organization [s]" and whether or not
the instrument was rated investment grade "by such rating organization."
Note that the OCC's revised regulation also defines "adequate capacity,"
although without adding a great deal of precision. The indicators for "adequate
capacity" include a low risk of default and the expectation of full and timely re-
payment-factors that could be considered more tautological than descriptive.
70.
71.
72.
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Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010).
12 C.F.R. § 28.15(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
12 C.F.R. § 28.15(a) (2014) (emphasis added).
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12 C.F.R. § 703.8: Broker-
dealers
(b) Before purchasing an
investment through a bro-
ker-dealer, a Federal credit
union must analyze and
annually
update the following:
(3) If the broker-dealer is
acting as the Federal credit
union's counterparty, the
ability of the broker-dealer
and its subsidiaries or affili-
ates to fulfill commitments,
as evidenced by capital
strength, liquidity, and op-
erating results. The Federal
credit union should consider
current financial data, an-
nual reports, reports of na-
tionally-recognized statistical
rating organizations, rele-
vant disclosure documents,
and other sources offinancial
information.73
12 C.F.R. § 703.8: Broker-
dealers
(b) Before purchasing an
investment through a bro-
ker-dealer, a Federal credit
union must analyze and
annually
update the following:
(3) If the broker-dealer is
acting as the Federal credit
union's counterparty, the
ability of the broker-dealer
and its subsidiaries or affil-
iates to fulfill commit-
ments, as evidenced by
capital strength, liquidity,
and operating results. The
Federal credit union should
consider current financial
data, annual reports, exter-
nal assessments of credit-
worthiness, relevant disclo-
sure documents, and other
sources offinancial infor-
mation.74
Rather than deleting (like the CFTC) or replacing (like the OCC), the
NCUA chose to rephrase its reference to credit ratings. In lieu of the "reports of
nationally-recognized statistical rating organizations," the NCUA now refers to
"external assessments of creditworthiness." Both NRSROs and "external as-
sessments" are arguably captured under the rule's concluding reference to "oth-
er sources of financial information," suggesting that the NCUA wished to retain
a reference to CRAs and their work product but was obliged to do so without
using the (now verboten) magic words.75
73. 12 C.F.R. § 703.8(b) (2010) (emphasis added).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 703.8(b) (2014) (emphasis added).
75. For further detail on the NCUA's actions to comply with § 939A, see Nat'l Credit
Union Admin., CORPORATE CREDIT UNION GUIDANCE LETTER No. 2013-01, FINAL
RULE-ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF CREDIT RATINGS (2013), http://www.ncua
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Regulator r Pre § 939A Post § 939A
National
Credit Union
Administration
(NCUA)
Regulator I Pre § 939A Post § 939A
12 C.F.R. §1267.3: Prohibited
investments and prudential
rules.
(a) Prohibited investments. A
Bank may not invest in:
(3) Debt instruments that are
not rated as investment grade,
except:
(ii) Debt instruments that
were downgraded to a below
investment grade rating after
acquisition by the Bank;
(4) Whole mortgages or oth-
er whole loans, or interests in
mortgages or
loans, except:
(iii) Marketable direct obliga-
tions of state, local, or Tribal
government units or agencies,
having at least the
second highest credit rating
from an NRSRO, where the
purchase of such obligations
by the Bank provides to the
issuer the customized terms,
necessary liquidity, or favor-
able pricing required to gen-
erate needed funding for
housing or community lend-
ing ... . 76
L ______________ I ____________________________ -
.gov/regulation-supervision/Pages/policy-compliance/communications/corporate
-guidance-letters/1ccu2Ol3-O1.aspx [http://perma.cc/X6L5-5FZF].
12 C.F.R. §1267.3(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
12 C.F.R. §1267.3(a) (2017) (emphasis added).
Federal
Housing
Finance
Agency
(FHFA)
76.
77.
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12 C.F.R. § 1267.3: Prohib-
ited investments and
prudential rules.
(a) Prohibited investments.
A Bank may not invest in:
(3) Debt instruments that
are not investment quality,
except:
(ii) Debt instruments that a
Bank determined became less
than investment quality be-
cause of developments or
events that occurred after
acquisition of the instru-
ment by the Bank;
(4) Whole mortgages or
other whole loans, or inter-
ests in mortgages or loans
except:
(iii) Marketable direct obliga-
tions of state, local, or Tribal
government units or agencies,
that are investment quality,
where the purchase of such
obligations by the Bank
provides to the
issuer the customized terms,
necessary liquidity, or fa-
vorable pricing required to
generate needed funding for
housing or community
lending...."
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In 2013, the OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC completed a "Uniform
Agreement on the Classification and Appraisal of Securities Held by Depository
Institutions.""8 A December 2016 advisory bulletin79 from the FHFA directs
parties interested in its definition of "investment grade" to this agreement.
The Uniform Agreement defines "investment grade" as follows: "A security
is investment grade if the issuer of the security has an adequate capacity to meet
financial commitments for the life of the asset." The Agreement then refers
banks and saving associations to "the regulations of [their] appropriate federal
banking agency" for further guidance. Note, however, that the Uniform Agree-
ment does not define "investment quality," (as appears in
§ 1267.3(a)(3)(4)(iii)), nor identify whether there is a substantive distinction
between "investment grade" and "investment quality."
Regulator I Pre § 939A Post § 939A
12 C.F.R. § 347.209: Pledge
of assets
(d) Assets that may be
pledged. Subject to the right
of the FDIC to require substi-
tution, a foreign bank may
pledge any of the kinds of as-
sets listed in this paragraph
(d); such assets must be de-
nominated in United States
dollars.
A foreign bank shall be
deemed to have pledged any
such assets for the benefit of
the FDIC or its designee at
such time as any such asset is
placed with the depository, as
follows:
(3) Commercial paper that is
rated P-1 or P-2, or their
equivalent by a nationally rec-
ognized rating service; provid-
12 C.F.R. § 347.209: Pledge of
assets
(d) Assets that may be
pledged. Subject to the right
of the FDIC to require substi-
tution, a foreign bank may
pledge any of the kinds of as-
sets listed in this paragraph
(d); such assets must be de-
nominated in United States
dollars.
A foreign bank shall be
deemed to have pledged any
such assets for the benefit of
the FDIC or its designee at
such time as any such asset is
placed with the depository, as
follows:
(3) Commercial paper that is
rated P-1 or P-2, or their
equivalent by a nationally rec-
ognized rating service; provid-
78. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF THE
TREASURY, OCC BULL. No. 2013-28, UNIFORM AGREEMENT ON THE CLASSIFICATION
AND APPRAISAL OF SECURITIES HELD BY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS (2013).
79. FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, ADVISORY BULLETIN: CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT
SECURITIES AT FHLBANKS AB 2016-01 (2016).
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Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation
(FDIC)
ed, that any conflict in a rating ed, that any conflict in a rating
shall be resolved in favor of the shall be resolved in favor of the
lower rating .... 8 lower rating .... .
Seven years after Congress passed Dodd-Frank and six years after the FDIC
presumptively complied with § 939A's mandate to assess all references to credit
ratings, the FDIC has yet to amend this provision addressing permissible asset
pledges for insured U.S. branches of foreign banks.
The FDIC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on June 21, 2016 indicat-
ing its intention to replace the current reference to NRSROs with "investment
grade."" The FDIC proposed to define "investment grade," for the purposes of
this regulation, as "a security whose issuer has adequate capacity to meet all fi-
nancial commitments under the security for the projected life of the exposure.
Such an entity has adequate capacity to meet financial commitments if the risk
of its default is low and the full and timely repayment of principal and interest
is expected." 3 This definition mimics that used elsewhere by the FDIC and in
the 2013 Uniform Agreement.
It is difficult to identify a common theme in these revisions (or lack there-
of) to the regulatory texts. The CFTC appears to have interpreted § 939A as
merely requiring deletion; while for the OCC, "rated investment grade by an
internationally recognized rating organization" became "has an adequate capac-
ity to meet financial commitments."14 The OCC's explanation of what consti-
tutes "adequate capacity," however, does little to clarify the new standard. The
FDIC has yet to finalize its proposed revisions, and it bears noting that none of
the agencies canvassed above has attempted to prevent regulated parties from
consulting credit ratings. Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below, agency
guidance has repeatedly underscored the expectation that investors will contin-
ue to use credit ratings.8 5
80. 12 C.F.R. § 347.209(d) (2010) (emphasis added).
81. 12 C.F.R. § 347.209(d) (2017) (emphasis added).
82. See Alternatives to References to Credit Ratings with Respect to Permissible Activ-
ities for Foreign Branches of Insured State Nonmember Banks and Pledge of As-
sets by Insured Domestic Branches of Foreign Banks, 81 Fed. Reg. 41,877, 41,889-
91 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 347).
83. Id. at 41879.
84. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 28.15(a) (2010) with 12 C.F.R. § 28.15(a) (2014).
85. See, e.g., Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the
Issuer Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 80 Fed. Reg.
58,124, 58,133 (Sept. 25, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274)
("[U]nder the proposed amendments, funds could continue to test their portfoli-
os against a potential downgrade or default in addition to any other indication or
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A 2016 report from the Treasury Department's Office of Financial Re-
search 6 sought to impose some order on federal agencies' strategies for com-
plying with § 939A by proposing a three-part typology. According to the report,
the agencies' most common strategy has been definitional. Under this ap-
proach, regulators replace references to credit ratings with a definition that aims
to capture the same substantive features, but without explicitly referring inves-
tors to third parties such as CRAs." The OCC's explanation of "adequate capac-
ity to meet financial commitments" detailed in Table 1 is indicative.
A second strategy entails mandating that regulated parties assess creditwor-
thiness using designated financial models." Thus banking regulators (including
the Department of the Treasury, OCC, Federal Reserve, and FDIC) have intro-
duced or modified certain models used to calculate banks' capital requirement
for securitized products in order to eliminate references to credit ratings on the
underlying obligations.'
The third strategy entails replacing references to CRAs with references to
alternative third party evaluators. 90 For example, some banking regulators have
replaced references to CRA ratings of sovereign debt with references to the Or-
gatnization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Country Risk Classi-
fications, notwithstanding the Organization's caveat that "[t]he country risk
classifications are not sovereign risk classifications and should not, therefore, be
compared with the sovereign risk classifications of private credit rating agencies
(CRAs)."91
Part III analyzes the wisdom of these and other approaches to implement-
ing § 939A. Before doing so, the following Section undertakes a more in-depth
review of one agency's experience revising a single provision: the SEC and rule
evidence of credit deterioration they determine appropriate."). See generally Part
III.a.i.
86. JOHN SOROUSHIAN, OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, BRIEF NO. 16-04, CREDIT RATINGS IN
FINANCIAL REGULATION: WHAT'S CHANGED SINCE THE DODD-FRANK ACT? (Apr. 21,
2016).
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Regulatory Capital Rules, 79 Fed. Reg. 20,754, 20,760-61 (Apr. 14, 2014)
(detailing the "Simplified supervisory formula approach").
go. Soroushian, supra note 86, at 3-4.
91. Country Risk Classification, OECD (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.oecd.org/trade/
xcred/crc.htm [http://perma.cc/QR6W-PECR] (noting, in bold text, that the
country risk classifications are "produced solely for the purpose of setting mini-
mum premium rates for transactions" supported by the OECD's Export Credits
Arrangement); see also Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 77 Fed. Reg.
53,059, 53,075-77 (Aug. 30, 2012) ("While recognizing that CRCs [country risk
classifications] have certain limitations, the agencies consider CRCs to be a rea-
sonable alternative to credit ratings .... ").
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2a-7 of the Investment Company Act. This five-year saga highlights several rea-
sons for concern alluded to in the preceding review.
B. The SEC and Rule 2a-7
Money market funds are a form of mutual fund developed in the 1970s in
order to provide investors with a higher-yielding, but still relatively secure, al-
ternative to interest-bearing bank accounts.92 Money market funds typically in-
vest in high-quality, short-maturity debt instruments whose dividends approx-
imate inter-bank lending rates of similar tenures. For investors, MMFs are often
used to earn a small return while assessing where to deploy capital on a longer-
term basis.93 The SEC's Division of Investment Management reports that MMFs
held $2.9 trillion in total assets as of May 31, 2017, $2.2 trillion of which was
held by MMFs that invest exclusively in government and treasury debt.9 4
The security typically associated with MMF investing is as much a function
of government regulation as industry advertising. The Investment Company
Act9 5 requires most investment funds to calculate the current net asset value of
each share in the fund with reference to its market value. If market valuations
are not available, firms must complete their own valuation in good faith.9' Un-
der rule 2a-7, MMFs are exempt from these requirements.97 Money market
funds may instead use what is known as the amortization cost method of valua-
tion, which allows MMFs to maintain a stable valuation of $1/share in a manner
akin to a deposit bank account.9' Coupled with this exemption, however, rule
2a-7 imposes strict parameters on the maturity, liquidity, and credit quality of
92. See Money Market Funds, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm. (Nov. 3, 2016),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/money-market.shtml [http://perma.cc5ZGJ-RU
MY].
93. See Jonathan R. Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual
Funds as Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits 3-8 (Yale Law Sch. Faculty
Scholarship Series, Research Paper No. 422, 2011).
94. Division of Inv. Mgmt., Money Market Fund Statistics, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM. 2 (June 15, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/mmf
-statistics/mmf-2017-5.pdf [http://perma.cc/S7YB-5MQU].
95. 17 C.F.R. pt. 270, amended by Pub. L. No. 112-90 (Jan. 3, 2012).
96. Division of Inv. Mgmt., Valuation of Portfolio Securities and other Assets Held
by Registered Investment Companies, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM.
(July 31, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/icvaluation.htm [http://
perma.cc/99E8-DQH5].
97. Id.
98. For further details on amortized cost and MMF valuation generally,
see INV. COMPANY INST., PRICING OF U.S. MONEY MARKET FUNDS (2011),
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_11_mmLpricing.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z678-28JG].
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the assets that MMFs may hold.99 As with most regulatory references to CRAs,
those in rule 2a-7 thus offered the SEC a convenient shorthand for the safety
and security the regulator aimed to safeguard.
The first reference to credit ratings appeared in rule 2a-7 in 1983.00 In In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 13380, "Valuation of Debt Instruments and
Computation of Current Price Per Share by Certain Open-End Investment
Companies," the SEC restricted MMFs to investing in dollar-denominated in-
struments that the fund's board of directors "determines present minimal credit
risks and which are of 'high quality' as determined by any major rating ser-
vice.""' As the Release explains, the reference to credit ratings was a belt-and-
suspenders measure: the SEC wanted the quality of the MMF's investments to
be subject to board review, but also the oversight of an independent third par-
ty."o2 The SEC had received "conflicting comments" regarding the proposed
standards from industry participants, with some arguing that the rule should
rely entirely on the board of directors' opinion, and others contending that the
rule should compel MMFs to rely on CRAs alone.1o3 In the final rule, the SEC
chose both.1o 4
It bears noting that § 939A of Dodd-Frank was not the first time that the
SEC had considered the wisdom of referring to credit ratings in its regulations.
The SEC solicited comments concerning the role of NRSROs in its regulations
99. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-782, ACTION NEEDED TO
IMPROVE RATING AGENCY REGISTRATION PROGRAM AND PERFORMANCE-RELATED
DISCLOSURES 49 (Sept. 2010).
ioo. Valuation of Debt Instruments and Computation of Current Price Per Share by
Certain Open-End Investment Companies (Money Market Funds), 48 Fed. Reg.
32,555, 32,566 (July 18, 1983) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 270).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 32560.
103. Id.
io. Id. ("The Commission believes that both tests are significant and, therefore, has
retained both in the rule. The requirement that a security have a high quality rat-
ing provides protection by ensuring input into the quality determination by an
outside source. However, the mere fact that an instrument has or would receive a
high quality rating may not be sufficient to ensure stability. The Commission be-
lieves that the instrument must be evaluated for the credit risk that it presents to
the particular fund at that time in light of the risks attendant to the use of amor-
tized cost valuation or penny-rounding. Moreover, the board may look at some
aspects when evaluating the risk of an investment that would not be considered by
the rating services.") Providing further guidance concerning what would consti-
tute a "major rating service," the SEC cites Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch
by name. In a footnote, it is careful to add, "The Commission does not intend to
prescribe that the ratings must come only from one of these three services." Id. at
32561 n.33.
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in 200305 and 2008.106 After taking little action in 2003, the SEC returned to the
subject just five years later in part due to findings from its Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examination (OCIE) that funds' compliance with their duty to
assess the safety and security of fund investments was worryingly variable.o7
The Commission took no enforcement actions in response to the findings.
In 2009, the SEC adopted a portion of the amendments proposed in its
2008 consultation." With regard to rule 2a-7, the SEC eliminated a provision
barring MMFs from investing in asset-backed securities that had not received a
credit rating. The SEC made no other modifications to rule 2a-7's references to
NRSROs.' 9 Not only had most respondents to the consultation opposed re-
moving the references, an OCIE report had also emphasized that "the proposed
rule [to remove certain references to NRSROs] eliminated the floor ... that
NRSRO references provided and it was unclear how, if at all, the standard for
eligible securities under the proposed rule would ensure that money market
funds continued to invest only in securities of the highest credit quality." 0
With the passage of § 939A, Congress overruled the SEC's decision to retain
such references, leaving to the SEC the task of determining "how, if at all" to
ensure that MMFs continued to invest in high-credit-quality securities without
referring to credit ratings. During the five-year process of proposed and re-
proposed rules that followed, the SEC sought to meet Congress's mandate
without undermining the rationales that had persuaded it to retain rule 2a-7's
references to NRSRO credit ratings just two years prior. Striking this balance
proved difficult.
1. The First Proposal
In March 2011, the SEC solicited comments on proposed amendments to
rule 2a-7 that would bring the provision into compliance with § 939A. The
amendments addressed five elements of the rule. Three are particularly germane
to this analysis and, to facilitate tracking the amendment process over time, will
structure the discussion that follows: (1) amendments to the criteria for deter-
mining whether a security is an "eligible security" for investment ("eligibility"),
105. Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Laws,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26066 (June 4, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258
(June 12, 2003).
106. References to Ratings of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28327 (July 1, 2008), 73 Fed. Reg. 40,124
(July 11, 2008).
107. GAO-10-782, supra note 99, at 53-56.
108. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,896, 12,896-97 (proposed Mar. 3, 2011) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274).
109. Id.
11o. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 99, at 55.
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(2) amendments concerning MMFs' monitoring of investments for adverse
credit events ("monitoring"), and (3) amendments to the quantitative and
qualitative assessments MMFs must complete in order to predict portfolio per-
formance during periods of substantial volatility ("stress testing").
i. Eligibility
In general, rule 2a-7 requires MMFs to invest exclusively in securities that
are liquid, short-term, and of high credit quality. Prior to the SEC's revisions to
comply with § 939A, credit ratings were a part of these eligibility criteria. Rule
2a-7 defined an "eligible security" as "A Rated Security"' with a remaining ma-
turity of 397 calendar days or less that has received a rating from the Requisite
NRSROs"2 in one of the two highest short-term rating categories," or an un-
rated security of comparable quality.u3 Two further conditions for determining
eligibility bear noting.
First, under the header "Portfolio Quality-general," rule 2a-7 mandated
that the MMF's board of directors determine that all securities purchased by the
fund posed "minimal credit risks" based on a set of factors that included, but
iii. A "Rated Security" is defined as either (i) a security that "has received a short-
term rating from a Designated NRSRO, or has been issued by an issuer that has
received a short-term rating from a Designated NRSRO with respect to a class of
debt obligations (or any debt obligation within that class)"; (ii) a security "subject
to a Guarantee that has received a short-term rating from a Designated NRSRO";
or (iii) a security that is not a Rated Security but "is subject to an external credit
support agreement (including an arrangement by which the security has become a
Refunded Security) that was not in effect when the security was assigned its rating,
unless the security has received a short-term rating reflecting the existence of the
credit support agreement." 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(21) (2011).
112. A "Requisite NRSRO" is defined as:
(i) Any two Designated NRSROs that have issued a rating with respect
to a security or class of debt obligations of an issuer; or
(ii) If only one Designated NRSRO has issued a rating with respect to
such security or class of debt obligations of an issuer at the time the
fund acquires the security, that Designated NRSRO.
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(23). "Designated NRSRO," in turn, means
any one of at least four nationally recognized statistical rating or-
ganizations as that term is defined in section 3(a)(62) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(62)) that:
(i) The money market fund's board of directors:
(A) Has designated as an NRSRO whose credit ratings... will be used
by the fund to determine whether a security is an Eligible Security;
and
(B) Determines at least once each calendar year issues credit ratings
that are sufficiently reliable for such use . . .
17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(11).
113. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(12).
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could not exclusively rely upon, credit ratings." 4 Second, rule 2a-7 permitted
MMFs to invest a maximum of three percent of the fund's total assets in "Sec-
ond Tier Securities.""' The rule defined a "second tier security" as "any Eligible
Security that is not a First Tier Security,""' meaning any security that is not (i)
"a Rated Security that has received a short-term rating from the Requisite
NRSROs in the highest short-term rating category for debt obligations"; (ii) an
"Unrated Security that is of comparable quality to a security meeting the re-
quirements for a Rated Security," as determined by the MMF's board; (iii) a se-
curity issued by a registered investment company that is a MMF; or (iv) a gov-
ernment security." 7
In the March 2011 proposal, the SEC suggested substituting the reference
to credit ratings in its definition of "eligible security" with a mandatory two-
step eligibility analysis. First, the MMF's board (or its delegate) would assess
whether the security "presents minimal credit risks," a phrase that would re-
main undefined but "must be based on factors pertaining to credit quality and
the issuer's ability to meet its short-term financial obligations."" If the security
cleared this hurdle, the MMF's board would then determine whether the securi-
ty was a first or second tier security. "Second tier" would still be defined as an
eligible security that is not a first tier security. However, the SEC proposed to
redefine "first tier" such that MMF boards would be required to conclude that
the issuer of the security has the "highest capacity to meet its short-term finan-
cial obligations.""9 All references to "designated NRSRO," "rated security,"
"requisite NRSRO," and "unrated security" would be removed in the process of
making these amendments. 20
In a July 2011 report, the SEC nonetheless explained that its proposed
standard for first tier securities "would be similar to the credit quality standards
that have been articulated by the credit rating agencies."m Indeed, a footnote in
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3) ("The money market fund shall limit its portfolio
investments to those United States Dollar-Denominated securities that the fund's
board of directors determines present minimal credit risks (which determination
must be based on factors pertaining to credit quality in addition to any rating as-
signed to such securities by a Designated NRSRO) and that are at the time of Ac-
quisition Eligible Securities.").
115. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(3)(ii).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(24).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(14).
118. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. at 12,898.
119. Id. at 12898.
120. Id.
121. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON REVIEw OF RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS
(2011), http://www.sec.gov/files/939astudy.pdf [http://perma.cc/9XYL-KN9C].
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the proposal explicitly cites the scoring systems of S&P, Moody's, and Fitch."'
Summarizing the proposed revisions to its eligibility standards, the SEC de-
scribed the changes as substituting the current "objective standard" for a stand-
ard that would "require a subjective determination of both eligible securities
and first tier securities" by the MMF's board.2 3
ii. Monitoring
Under the heading of "Downgrades, Defaults and Other Events,"'4 rule 2a-
7 had mandated that an MMF's board "reassess promptly" whether a portfolio
security continued to present "minimal credit risks" if the security, (1) if rated,
had been downgraded from the first or second tier of the CRA's scoring system
or, (2) if unrated, no longer presented comparable risks as a security rated as
first or second tier.12 5
Instead of utilizing credit rating downgrades, the SEC proposed that MMF
boards would be required to revisit their determination that a given investment
posed minimal credit risks "in the event the money market fund's adviser ...
becomes aware of any credible information ... that suggests that the security is
no longer a first tier security or a second tier security."''2 Much as with its pro-
posed amendments to eligibility, however, the use of credit ratings would by no
means be forbidden. "Credible information," the SEC noted, could include a
rating downgrade."'
iii. Stress Testing
Rule 2a-7 required MMFs to maintain written procedures providing for pe-
riodic tests assessing the fund's ability to maintain a stable net asset value of one
dollar per share based upon hypothetical events that had to "include, but are
not limited to, a change in short-term interest rates, an increase in shareholder
redemptions, a downgrade of or default on portfolio securities, and the widen-
ing or narrowing of spreads between yields on an appropriate benchmark the
fund has selected."" The SEC's proposed amendment was straightforward: ra-
ther than assessing the effect of a "downgrade," stress tests would have to in-
122. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. at 12,898 n.29.
123. Id. at 12899.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(7) (2011).
125. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(7)(i)(A)(1-2).
126. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. at 12,900.
127. Id. at 12,905 ("[A] fund could treat a downgrade as a credit event that might ad-
versely affect a portfolio security.").
128. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(c)(10)(v)(A).
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clude "a hypothetical event" that involves "an adverse change in the ability of a
portfolio security issuer to meet its short-term financial obligations."` 9 The
2011 proposal notes that this hypothetical event is "designed to have a similar
impact on a money market fund's portfolio" as a ratings downgrade.""'o
2. The Re-Proposal
The SEC returned to rule 2a-7 in June 2013 without having adopted or re-
jected any of its proposed amendments set out in 2011. The 2013 proposals,
however, had a different ambition altogether. Rather than bringing the SEC into
compliance with § 939A, the SEC detailed sweeping reforms addressing the re-
siliency of MMFs generally. Indeed, the SEC refers to § 939A once over the
course of the document's 698 pages, noting that "we are not rescinding our out-
standing 2011 proposal to remove references to credit ratings," and "intend[] to
address this matter at another time," adding that "we welcome additional
comments" in the meantime.131 With one exception, additional comments were
not forthcoming.132 The SEC returned to § 939A in July 2014.
i. Eligibility
Many of the comments the SEC received addressing the 2011 proposals ob-
jected to the mooted two-step eligibility analysis. In particular, commenters
were concerned that neither they nor the SEC would be able to differentiate be-
tween first and second tier securities, nor between securities that met the stand-
ards for "minimal credit risk" and "first tier." 33
The 2014 re-proposal responded to these comments by offering to dispense
with the two-tiered framework entirely. Rather than categorizing an investment
as first or second tier, the SEC proposed that funds could look to the same (un-
defined) set of factors they used when assessing whether a security posed "min-
imal credit risks." Under the re-proposed amendment, an "eligible security"
129. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. at 12,900.
130. Id.
131. Money Market Fund Reform: Amendments to Form PF, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,834,
36,849 (June 19, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, 270, 274,
279).
132. See Comments on Proposed Rule, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 21,
2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-11/s70711.shtml [http://perma.cc/
KLX8-N52G].
133. See, e.g., Committee on Investment Management Regulation, Comment Letter on
Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule 5-6 (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-1 1/s70711-44.pdf [http://perma.cc/P8K3-
RWC5].
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would be a security "[w]ith a remaining maturity of 397 calendar days or less
that the fund's board of directors determines presents minimal credit risks,
which determination must include a finding that the security's issuer has an ex-
ceptionally strong capacity to meet its short-term financial obligations."134
The SEC acknowledged apprehensions that MMF directors may take ad-
vantage of the amendment in order to invest in a greater proportion of higher
yielding, formerly "second tier" securities than the maximum of three percent
of total assets permitted under the prior rule. 35 The SEC responded that the
novel "exceptionally strong capacity" requirement should provide an adequate
check.' 6 The "exceptionally strong capacity" standard, the Commission noted,
"is designed to preserve the current degree of risk limitation in rule 2a-7 with-
out reference to credit ratings."137 To illustrate which securities would meet the
new "exceptionally strong capacity" standard, the SEC cited the ratings defini-
tions of Fitch, Moody's, and S&P.'*
Requesting comment on this approach to eligibility determinations, the
SEC asked whether commenters believed there was an "alternative standard for
making credit quality determinations that is more objective than the re-
proposed standard," adding that "no commenters provided suggestions when
we sought comment in the 2011 proposal." 39
ii. Monitoring
Commenters were equally unimpressed with the 2011 proposal's amend-
ments to monitoring requirements. Many argued that the proposed trigger for a
credit assessment-"in the event the money market fund's adviser .. . becomes
aware of any credible information"' 4o-was vague and difficult to administer.
Several suggested that the SEC instead require MMFs to perform ongoing mon-
itoring and eliminate the requirement to review investments in response to spe-
cific events.141
134. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 79 Fed. Reg.
47,986, 48,013 (proposed Aug. 14, 2014).
135. Id. at 47,990.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 47,989 n.38.
139. Id. at 47,990.
140. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,896, 12,900 (proposed Mar. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274).
141. See, e.g., T. Rowe Price, Comment Letter on References to Credit Ratings in Cer-
tain Investment Company Act Rules and Forms 3 (Apr. 25, 2011),
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The SEC was persuaded: "[C]onsistent with the approach suggested by a
number of commenters, we instead re-propose to require that each money
market fund adopt written procedures that require the fund adviser to provide
ongoing review of the credit quality of each portfolio security."'" This ongoing
review would determine whether the security continued to present minimal
credit risks. As a result, the SEC did not anticipate that the proposal would sig-
nificantly alter the status quo.' 43
iii. Stress Testing
The 2011 proposal called for MMFs to test the safety of their investments
against a "hypothetical event" that involved "an adverse change in the ability of
a portfolio security issuer to meet its short-term financial obligations."4 Here,
commenters' objections were more technical. Industry participants argued that
in passing § 939A, Congress was not attempting to prohibit references to credit
ratings tout court, but rather to bar only those references requiring the use of
credit ratings to assess creditworthiness. The Dreyfus Corporation, for example,
argued that " [t] he fact of a credit rating downgrade and its potential impact on
security prices is directly relevant to the stability of money market funds, but
not relevant to the standard of the 'use of an assessment of creditworthiness' as
provided by Section 939A."'4 1 Under the requirements of the 2011 proposal, the
SEC "would simply require funds to stress test for price declines without attrib-
uting them to a credit rating downgrade, which," the Dreyfus comment con-
cluded, "seems nonsensical.""'6
The 2014 re-proposal ignored such attempts to restrict § 939A's reach. In-
stead, the SEC emphasized that its initial proposal did not set out an exclusive
list of hypothetical events. Regulated parties were thus free to "continue to test
their portfolios against a potential downgrade or default in addition to any oth-
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-11/s70711-9.pdf [http://perma.ccd78C6-6X
WE].
142. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at
47,995.
143. Id. ("We do not believe that the re-proposal... would significantly change cur-
rent fund practices in monitoring minimal credit risks in the portfolio.").
144. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. at 12,900.
145. Dreyfus Corporation, Comment Letter on References to Credit Ratings in Certain
Investment Company Act Rules and Forms 9 n. iv (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www
.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-11/s70711-19.pdf [http://perma.cc/JR4F-3PAV].
146. Id.
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er indication or evidence of credit deterioration they determine appropriate."`4
Indeed, the re-proposal included a downgrade or default as examples of events
indicating credit deterioration.4S
3. The Final Rule
The Conm-nission released its final rule to bring rule 2a-7 into compliance
with § 939A in September 2015.
i. Eligibility
Commenters addressing the 2014 re-proposal highlighted several outstand-
ing ambiguities, such as that the new "exceptionally strong" standard would be
difficult to differentiate from other factors presumptively included in the requi-
site "minimal credit risk" assessment. 49 The SEC again agreed and chose to re-
tain only the "minimal credit risk" assessment.' It also chose to leave this
phrase undefined.'
In a bid to retain some "objectivity," however, the Commission codified
previous guidance concerning the factors relevant for minimal credit risk as-
sessments.' Rule 2a-7's definition for "eligible security" now stipulates that a
MMF's assessment of whether a security presents minimal credit risk must in-
clude, to the extent appropriate, consideration of the following factors with re-
spect to the security's issuer or guarantor:
(A) Financial condition; (B) Sources of liquidity; (C) Ability to react to
future market-wide and issuer- or guarantor-specific events, including
147. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at
47,996.
148. Id. at n.114.
149. See, e.g., Fidelity Investments, Comment Letter on Proposed Removal of Certain
References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer Diversification Re-
quirement in the Money Market Fund Rule 3 (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07- 11/s70711-36.pdf [http://perma.cc/U4E8-
2URT) (arguing "[t]he Proposed 'Exceptionally Strong Capacity to Meet its
Short-Term Obligations' Standard Introduces Uncertainty Without a Corre-
sponding Benefit" and concluding "the new language is ineffectual").
150. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 80 Fed. Reg.
58,124, 58,125 (Sept. 25, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
151. See id.
152. The Commission refers to these factors as "objective and verifiable tools" that
regulated parties and SEC examiners can "rely on in the absence of NRSRO rat-
ings and which should help to achieve our goal of maintaining a similar degree of
credit risk as in current money market fund portfolios." Id. at 58,127.
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ability to repay debt in a highly adverse situation; and (D) Strength of
the issuer or guarantor's industry within the economy and relative to
economic trends, and issuer or guarantor's competitive position within
its industry."5 3
ii. Monitoring
The final rule adopted the re-proposal's language concerning monitoring
verbatim. Under 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(g)(3), MMFs must now maintain written
procedures that "require the adviser to provide ongoing review of whether each
security (other than a government security) continues to present minimal credit
risks." The provision goes on to stipulate that this ongoing review must
"[i]nclude an assessment of each security's credit quality" and be based on, in-
ter alia, financial data concerning the issuer of the security or its guarantor.15 4
iii. Stress Testing
The re-proposed stress testing regime elicited little enthusiasm from com-
menters; however nor was there substantial criticism. The Mutual Fund Direc-
tors Forum's comments are indicative, offering a half-hearted note of dissent
while cognizant that there was sufficient room in the text to effectively preserve
the status quo: "While we agree with previous commenters that retaining the
reference to a credit downgrade would be preferable, we believe that the new
standard will not significantly change the substance of existing stress tests, and
thus do not oppose the proposed amendment."'5 5
The SEC described the final rule similarly: "We continue to believe that
amending the stress testing provision as proposed will continue to promote ef-
fective stress testing while implementing Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank
Act.""' Put differently, the SEC was pleased to technically satisfy Congress's
mandate while substantially preserving the status quo ante. As suggested in the
re-proposal, § 270.2a-7(g)(8) now requires MMFs to maintain written proce-
dures providing for periodic stress testing "based upon specified hypothetical
events that include, but are not limited to: ... (B) An event indicating or evi-
dencing credit deterioration, such as a downgrade or default of particular port-
153. - Id. at 58,153.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(g)(3)(i)-(ii) (2011).
155. Mutual Fund Directors Forum, Comment Letter on Removal of Certain
References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer Diversification Re-
quirement in Money Market Fund Rule 5 (Sept. 14, 2014), http://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-11/s70711-46.pdf [http://perma.cc/8RNL-CAVS].
156. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at
58,133.
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folio security positions."'7 This is the sole appearance of the term "downgrade"
in rule 2a-7's revised text. All other references to credit ratings have been re-
moved.
III. ANALYSIS
The impetus for § 939A of Dodd-Frank was the belief that investors and
regulators had over-relied on credit ratings prior to the financial crisis. Section
939A, however, instructs federal agencies to remove "any" reference to credit
ratings. At the heart of this Note's critique of § 939A is the inconsistency be-
tween Congress's diagnosis and prescription. The latter does not follow from
the former because overreliance implies that some reliance remains appropriate.
Federal agencies have sought to retain discretion to stipulate the appropri-
ate boundaries of this "some" while simultaneously meeting the categorical
mandate of § 939A. The preceding Part traced, in neutral terms, the results of
this tension. Part III drops the impartiality. Section III.A considers the wisdom
of § 939A. I argue that even if one accepts the diagnosis of overreliance-a con-
clusion of which I am skeptical, but do not dispute for present purposes-
§ 939A is unlikely to remedy that ill. Section III.B steps back to consider § 939A
in light of Congress's broader ambitions concerning CRA reform. I claim that
not only is § 939A unlikely to remedy overreliance, it may also undermine relat-
ed measures seeking to alleviate conflicts of interest.
A. Section 939A and Mandatory Self-Reliance
Among those federal agencies that have reached facial compliance with
§ 939A, few have sought to uphold anything more than the bare letter of its
mandate. Granted, from a certain perspective, § 939A is only about "letters,"
and to that extent the agencies' implementation could be said to have upheld
the provision's spirit as well. Yet if one takes the ambition of § 939A to be more
than the mechanical erasure of references to credit ratings-that is, if one takes
the diagnosis of overreliance seriously-it is clear that the provision has not
been successful. Starting from the discrepancy between Congress's diagnosis
and prescription, this Section draws on the preceding empirical review to iden-
tify the reasons why. I divide these reasons into "supply" and "demand" factors,
the former addressing the design of the amended regulations and their supervi-
sion, and the latter concentrating on why regulators and investors utilize credit
ratings in the first place.
1. "Supply-Side" Critiques
Perhaps the leading reason why § 939A is unlikely to reduce reliance on
CRAs relates to its allotment of regulatory discretion. The measure is profligate
157. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(g)(8).
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where it should have been miserly, and stingy where it should have been gener-
ous.
Start with § 939A's profligacy. The provision imposes no restraints on regu-
lators' decisions concerning the replacement text for existing references to cred-
it ratings. Section 939A simply calls for regulators to "substitute in such regula-
tions such standard of credit-worthiness as each respective agency shall
determine as appropriate.""' Those tasked with revising the provisions appear
to have begun from the premise that what was most "appropriate" was the
standard prior to Congress's interference. Put colloquially, it wasn't broke, so
they objected to the fix.
The SEC's amendments to rule 2a-7 are indicative. Discussing the (ulti-
mately rejected) "exceptionally strong capacity" standard for eligibility in its
2014 re-proposal, the SEC noted, approvingly, that "the phrase 'strong capacity'
reflects the standard that one NRSRO articulates for securities with a second ti-
er rating."5 9 Likewise, describing how the Commission expected regulated par-
ties to implement the new stress testing regime, the SEC observed that "a fund
adviser's obligation to monitor risks to which the fund is exposed would, as a
practical matter, require the adviser to monitor for downgrades by relevant
credit rating agencies.""o The key phrase here is "as a practical matter." In-
structed by Congress to devise an "appropriate" alternative to credit ratings,
federal agencies took care to ensure that regulated parties could proceed as if
the amendments had never occurred; which is to say, relying on credit ratings
when and where they saw fit.
Regulators have also used their discretion under § 939A to formulate vague
amendments granting them greater enforcement discretion.61 The four invest-
ment eligibility factors that the SEC chose to codify in rule 2a-7 are indicative.
These include the investment's financial condition, sources of liquidity, ability
to react to future adverse credit events, and the "[s]trength of the issuer or
guarantor's industry within the economy and relative to economic trends, and
issuer or guarantor's competitive position within its industry.""' Setting to one
side that all of this information is conveyed in a typical CRA report, it is diffi-
cult to anticipate how an MMF would demonstrate-if challenged during an
inspection or in an enforcement action-the reasonableness of its interpreta-
tion of variables as indeterminate as the issuer's industry's strength "relative to
economic trends." A similar concern applies to the OCC's standard of "ade-
158. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (2010).
159. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 79 Fed. Reg.
47,986, 47,990 (proposed Aug. 14, 2014).
160. Id. at 47,995-96.
161. For those wary of the administrative state, this is of course an ill in and of itself
regardless of any negative implications for the efficacy of § 939A.
162. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(a)(11)(a)-(d).
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quate capacity to meet financial commitments." 6 3 The OCC does provide fur-
ther guidance in the next sentence of its revised regulation, explaining that
"[a]n issuer has an adequate capacity to meet financial commitments if the risk
of default by the obligor is low and the full and timely repayment of principal
and interest is expected."16 4 But a rough translation of that explanation under-
scores its inadequacy: regulated parties may demonstrate the debtor's capacity
to repay by demonstrating that the debtor can repay.
Though it is hazardous to predict investors' response to indeterminate en-
forcement, it is at least plausible that the vagueness of the amended text will en-
courage investors concerned with demonstrating compliance toward the few
"objective" sources available. Coupled with regulators' repeated acknowledg-
ments that consulting credit ratings remains wholly appropriate, this may mean
investors rely even more on CRAs.
Section 939A is also stingy where it should have granted greater discretion.
One purported consequence of investors' overreliance on credit ratings is their
"herd behavior" in reacting to credit ratings. 6 5 The expression refers to the de-
stabilizing impact on markets when large numbers of investors respond simul-
taneously, and identically, to a credit rating announcement for a given issuer or
security. The typical analogy likens the behavior to lemmings proceeding over a
cliff.'66 Yet § 939A calls for federal agencies to establish "uniform" standards of
163. 12 C.F.R. § 28.15(a)(iii) (2014).
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY BD., PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE, supra note 15, at
1 (citing pro-cycicality and herd behavior as consequences of investors' overreli-
ance on credit ratings); Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner, SEC, Speech at SEC
Open Meeting: Removal of Credit Rating References From Exchange Act Rules
(Apr. 27, 2011) (including "herding behavior" among the "broad, negative and
damaging consequences... of hardwiring ratings in our rules" and arguing that
understanding and correcting these consequences "is one of the most important
lessons from the crisis").
166. But see Henry Nichols, The Truth About Norwegian Lemmings, BBC (Nov. 21,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/earth/story/20141122-the-truth-about-lemmings [htt
p://perma.cc/M6BF-UR9N] ("Despite what you have heard, lemmings are not
stupid, they don't suicidally hurl themselves off cliffs."). A Walt Disney documen-
tary, White Wilderness, is partly to blame. Dramatizing the mass suicide, a voice-
over informs the viewer: "This is the last chance to turn back, yet over they go,
casting themselves bodily out into space." See White Wilderness, YOUTUBE (Nov.
15, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-xMZlr5Gf9yY [http://perma.cc/
4TTT-G2F2]. As it turns out, the lemmings in White Wilderness were tipped into
the sea from a truck. Those with a soft spot for lemmings are advised to stop view-
ing at 01:30, although the moderator later notes that the lemmings died due to
subsequent drowning rather than the (compelled) leap itself.
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credit-worthiness, replicating the ill.16 7 Thus, the SEC boasts that codifying the
four components of its staff guidance for assessing eligibility under rule 2a-7
will "promote uniform credit quality standards in the absence of specific
NRSRO ratings requirements."'" Similarly, some regulators have met the re-
quirements of § 939A by referring regulated parties to alternative, third party
evaluators of creditworthiness. Thus, rather than the lemmings stampeding to-
ward the cliff in response to a CRA report, we can imagine a future where the
same occurs in response to, for example, a revision to the country risk classifica-
tion by the OECD.
By affording discretion where specificity was required, and restraining dis-
cretion precisely where a more diverse set of approaches would have been most
useful, Congress decreased the likelihood that § 939A would reduce investors'
reliance on credit ratings.
2. "Demand-Side" Critiques
Section 939A is also unlikely to achieve Congress's ambitions because the
provision does not grapple with why investors and regulators chose (and con-
tinue to choosel6 9) to use credit ratings. For regulators, outsourcing the deter-
mination of appropriate criteria for creditworthiness to CRAs was not a prod-
uct of laziness but rather an accurate recognition of private sector expertise. For
investors, credit ratings help reduce transaction costs stemming from infor-
mation asymmetries. Had the drafters of § 939A accounted for these motiva-
tions, there is little doubt they would have designed a different measure.
Beginning with the motives of regulators, the revisions to rule 2a-7 once
again offer a useful case study. The rule's final text addressing monitoring re-
quirements instructs MMFs to maintain written procedures that "require the
adviser to provide ongoing review of whether each security (other than a gov-
ernment security) continues to present minimal credit risks" and stipulates that
this review must "[i]nclude an assessment of each security's credit quality."17 0
This provision replaces text that required investors to review the creditworthi-
ness of investments in response to specific events, including credit rating down-
grades.
167. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939A(b), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) ("In making
such determination, such agencies shall seek to establish, to the extent feasible,
uniform standards of credit-worthiness for use by each such agency. . . .").
168. Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 80 Fed. Reg.
58,124, 58,127 (Sept. 25, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274).
169. See, e.g., Jess Cornaggia et al., Credit Ratings and the Cost of Municipal Financing,
REV. FIN. STUD. (2017) (using a Moody's rating scale recalibration in 2010 to find
that investors continue to rely on ratings to assess credit risks).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(g)(3).
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The new text is both more difficult to comply with and less likely to ad-
vance the purpose of monitoring. In substituting a set of specific, identifiable
variables for indeterminate factors such as continuing to present "minimal
credit risks" and strong "credit quality," the revised monitoring requirements
encourage MMFs to expand the scope of their analysis such that the signals are
more likely to be lost in the noise. Had Congress appreciated that regulatory
references to credit ratings reflected an efficient deferral to private sector exper-
tise, it may have also anticipated that regulators would seek to replace references
to credit ratings with ambiguous text that permits the same behavior. Indeed, as
noted above, the SEC cited investors' capacity to continue consulting credit rat-
ings for monitoring purposes as an advantage of the revised text. Put in some-
what sharper terms, strictly facial compliance with § 939A is a virtue.
Turning to regulated parties, investors use CRAs to mitigate information
asymmetries, and more generally, to reduce the transaction costs incurred in
collecting information. Granted, Congress does not enact laws solely to advance
economic efficiency. A defender of § 939A may further contend that investors
proved themselves incapable of self-regulation in 2007, and if increased transac-
tion costs accompany necessary reform, then perhaps that effect is best under-
stood as the overdue compulsory internalization of negative externalities.
On the other hand, if, as the preceding analysis claims, § 939A is unlikely to
have a material effect on these externalities and is instead likely to increase costs
in the name of superficial compliance, then Congress can and should take in-
vestors' complaints into account. Their complaints have, perhaps tactically, fo-
cused less on costs and more on Congress's failure to appreciate that many of
the services provided by CRAs are difficult for all but the most sophisticated of
investors to undertake in-house. 7' Congress is unlikely to wean investors from
credit ratings until it can point toward a viable (including cost efficient) alterna-
tive.
The "supply" and "demand" oversights of § 939A are specific flaws that fol-
low from Congress's more general failure to appreciate that, in the context of
sophisticated financial transactions, self-reliance may be an inefficient ideal. At
the very least, the example of § 939A indicates that it cannot be achieved by dik-
tat. Below,72 I suspend the assumption that the diagnosis of overreliance was
accurate. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that even assuming inves-
tors were unduly dependent on credit ratings, proclaiming "thou shalt not" and
deferring the remainder to federal agencies was an inadequate response.
171. However, costs have not been entirely ignored. See, e.g., Oversight of the Credit
Rating Agencies Post-Dodd-Frank: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Services, supra note 64 (statement of Grego-
ry W. Smith, General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer, Colorado Public Em-
ployees' Retirement Association) (noting in prepared remarks that "identifying
cost efficient measures that could comprise a robust, objective evaluation of credit
risk remains elusive").
172. See Part IV.C, infra.
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B. Section 939A and Conflicts of Interest
Subtitle C of Dodd-Frank, "Improvements to the Regulation of Credit Rat-
ing Agencies," aimed to address both of the principal criticisms of CRAs. The
Congressional findings detailed in § 931 thus highlight the "reliance placed on
credit ratings by individual and institutional investors and financial regulators,"
and that, " [ii n certain activities . . . credit rating agencies face conflicts of inter-
est that need to be carefully monitored and that therefore should be addressed
explicitly in legislation."3
Dodd-Frank includes several measures designed to understand and allevi-
ate these conflicts of interest. Sections 939C-F, for example, require the SEC
and Government Accountability Office to study the feasibility of various re-
forms to CRAs' business model and the broader industry's oligopolistic organi-
zation.174 Section 939F promised to be the most sweeping. It instructs the SEC
to study conflicts of interest associated with the rating of structured financial
products, and the feasibility of establishing a public utility that would assign a
CRA to a given issuer or issuance.'75 To illustrate, in lieu of an issuer selecting
Fitch to rate its securities, the issuer would apply to the public utility, which
would then assign a qualified CRA to the issuance. At least in theory, Fitch
would therefore have less incentive to seek repeat business by issuing an inaccu-
rately favorable rating. Critically, § 939F placed the burden on the SEC to
demonstrate why the proposed public utility was not necessary, stipulating that
the SEC "shall implement the system ... unless the Commission determines
that an alternative system would better serve the public interest and the protec-
tion of investors."'1 6
SEC staff completed the study mandated by § 939F and provided their rec-
ommendations to Congress in December 2012. However, the study's primary
recommendation encouraged the SEC (note: not Congress) to "convene a
roundtable" to discuss the study and its findings. 7 There is no indication that
this roundtable was ever convened, or that the senators calling for a fundamen-
tal reorientation of the credit rating industry are particularly concerned about
the mooted public utility's quiet death.
The fate of § 939F is interesting in and of itself as a case study in how con-
gressional ambitions may be overcome by industry and bureaucratic inertia. Its
greater relevance here, however, relates to the evidence it provides of Congress's
willingness to adopt (if not follow through on) drastic measures to mitigate
173. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 931(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1872 (2010).
174. Id. § 939F(C)-(F) at 1888-90.
175. Id. § 939F at 1889-90.
176. Id. § 939F(d)(1) at 1890.
177. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ASSIGNED CREDIT RATINGS 73
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/assigned-credit-ratings-study.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YHU7-VTNU].
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CRAs' conflicts of interest. A majority of the House and Senate was willing to
transform the basic operation of the industry in order to combat these per-
ceived failings. In this light, it is all the more striking that § 939A may very well
exacerbate conflicts of interest.
The view that CRAs are inherently conflicted is typically premised on some
version of the following logic: (1) Much of CRAs' revenues come from fees paid
by issuers to obtain credit ratings; (2) issuers enjoy lower borrowing costs when
credit ratings are high; (3) CRAs seeking repeat business are therefore disposed
to assign a higher credit rating than if this decision had no bearing on future
revenues; and, sometimes overlooked, (4) investors will not provide an ade-
quate check on such "rating inflation,"'" because their investment mandates
often stipulate rating floors.'79 Issuers, CRAs, and investors therefore all benefit
from inaccurately high ratings-until a default.
Now consider § 939A once more. Credit ratings first appeared in regula-
tions after the 1929 stock market collapse in order to curtail investors' discre-
tion, limiting the investment universe to assets deemed creditworthy by a pre-
sumptively objective assessor. Section 939A runs in the opposite direction,
calling on investors to exercise greater responsibility by eliminating mandatory
consultation of the (no longer presumptively objective) assessors. Sections
939C-F, meanwhile, are premised at least in part on the belief that investors face
the same conflicts of interest as issuers and CRAs. They, too, have a vested in-
terest in higher credit ratings. The upshot is an incoherent amalgamation of be-
havioral theories: investors are foxes for some purposes and hens for others. For
the conflicts of interest targeted in Sections 939C-F, investors cannot be trusted.
For the overreliance targeted in § 939A, they must be.
The SEC alluded to this tension when discussing its proposal to remove the
tiers of eligibility framework from rule 2a-7. It acknowledged that "under the
proposed subjective standard, a money market fund board (or its delegate)
could disregard a second tier rating in order to invest a larger portion of the
fund's portfolio in lower quality securities that it classifies as first tier securi-
178. See Patrick Bolton et al., The Credit Ratings Game, 67 J. FIN. 85, 86-89 (2012).
179. See INT'L ORG. SEC. COMM'Ns, GOOD PRACTICES ON REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRAS
IN ASSET MANAGEMENT 13-15 (June, 2015), http://www.iosco.org/1ibrary/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD488.pdf [http://perma.cc/3K5K-8S7K]. For an insightful
and accessible discussion of conflicts of interest in the credit rating industry, see
Stephen G. Cecchetti & Kermit L. Schoenholtz, Credit Ratings and Conflicts of In-
terest, MONEY & BANKING (June 6, 2016), http://www.moneyandbanking.com/
commentary/2016/6/6/credit-ratings-and-conflicts-of-interest [http://perma.cc/
2XH7-VEHE]. See also EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., COMPETITION AND CHOCE IN
THE CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/library/2016-1662_cramarketsharecalculation.pdf [http://perma
.cc/R7WF-UMN5]; Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rat-
ing Industry, 13 LEGISLATION & PUB. POL'Y 253, 253-70 (2010).
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ties.""so In other words, the SEC granted that MMFs face incentives to inflate
credit ratings. The Commission never elaborated on this point, and as the final
text of rule 2a-7 indicates, the tension did not prove a barrier to dispensing with
the tiers of eligibility framework and granting investors greater discretion. The
SEC's decision may reflect the blunt mandate of § 939A, or a belief that the
benefits from greater investor independence would exceed the potential harms
stemming from investor-driven rating inflation. In either case, it appears that
§ 939A is not just unlikely to fulfill its particular aim of reducing overreliance, it
may also undermine Dodd-Frank's attempts to reduce conflicts of interest.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND PATHS FORWARD
This final Part begins, in Section IV.A., by addressing two rebuttals to the
criticisms above: first, that the benefits of § 939A exceed its imperfections, and
second, that condemnation of § 939A is premature. Finding both arguments
wanting, Sections IV.B and IV.C turn to assessing alternatives to the blunt
mandate in § 939A. Section IV.B considers the EU's recent attempts to imple-
ment the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board. I find that the
method, though perhaps not the precise content, of EU provisions may provide
a path forward for the U.S. Congress. Section IV.C concludes by exploring what
options may be available to policy makers if we suspend the assumption that
overreliance is an accurate diagnosis and thus appropriate starting point for re-
forming the credit ratings industry.
A. Counterarguments
Section 939A's defenders may argue that the criticisms leveled in Part III
caricature Congress's ambitions. The drafters of Dodd-Frank did not expect
every investor-no matter how ill-equipped-to perform all of its own due dil-
igence. Nor did Congress expect that merely by erasing the term "NRSRO"
from administrative regulations, issuers and investors would suddenly forsake
CRAs or be excused from contracts mandating they rely on credit ratings. This
argument contends that Congress's ambition was instead incremental, viewing
§ 939A as a first step in a long-term project of weaning issuers, regulators, and
investors off of entrenched habits. In brief, this first counterargument main-
tains that the critiques above risk making the perfect the enemy of the good.
The argument falls short because this Note's analysis suggests not just that
§ 939A is imperfect, but that it is harmful. Without rehearsing the "supply" or
"demand" side critiques above, erasing all regulatory references to credit ratings
is less likely to reduce overreliance than it is to raise transaction, compliance,
and enforcements costs. The net outcome with regard to overreliance is there-
fore not a small, provisional step forward, but rather a potentially substantial
180. References to Credit Ratings in Certain Investment Company Act Rules and
Forms, 76 Fed. Reg. 12,896, 12,908 (proposed Mar. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274).
512
36:473 2018
CREDIT RATINGS, CONGRESS, AND MANDATORY SELF-RELIANCE
step backward. With respect to conflicts of interest, § 939A affords greater dis-
cretion to the very same investors that Sections 939C-F presume to be incentiv-
ized to inflate creditworthiness. The resulting conceptual incoherence has left
regulators and investors alike befuddled. Federal agencies have responded with
cosmetic amendments that substantially preserve the status quo, albeit with ad-
ditional enforcement uncertainty and transaction costs. This, too, is a step
backward. The counterargument thus falls short even if we accept its central
premise: far from making the perfect the enemy of the good, we should be
quick to make even the perfect the enemy of the bad.
The second counterargument objects on grounds of ripeness, contending
that the criticisms of § 939A above are hasty and lacking in empirical support.
When federal agencies have only recently (or in the case of the FDIC, not yet 8')
reached full compliance with the measure, it is premature to call for amend-
ment. As much as patience is a virtue-and accepting that some regulated par-
ties prefer certainty regardless of the regulation's content1S-this critique is un-
persuasive because it asks critics to wait for evidence of § 939A's efficacy that is
unlikely to ever arrive.
Consider the next financial crisis. Suppose, first, that the crisis in all rele-
vant respects mirrors that of 2007: credit ratings are revised precipitously from
inaccurate highs, investors suffer indiscriminately as the market turns against
even creditworthy investments, and Congress again says "never again." Would
this prove that § 939A had failed because overreliance on credit ratings contin-
ued to plague financial markets? Not necessarily. Briefly put, correlation and
causation are exceptionally difficult to distinguish in parsing investment moti-
vations or outcomes.
Suppose that the market tanks once more. This time, despite CRAs again
precipitously downgrading securities from inaccurate highs, investors' suffering
is highly variable, and Congress now says "mission accomplished." Was
§ 939A's mission to reduce overreliance actually accomplished? Again, not nec-
essarily. That investors' outcomes diverged does not prove that they were now
exercising greater independence in their credit assessments. Proving that it was
investors' newfound independence that explained the divergent investment
181. See supra pp. 118-20.
182. Alternative currencies and the burgeoning marijuana industry are demonstrative.
See, e.g., Trevor Hughes, Uncertainty Roils American Marijuana Industry over
Feared Federal Crackdown, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www
.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/01/04/uncertainty-roils-american-marijuana
-industry-over-feared-federal-crackdown/ 1004250001 [http://perma.cc/324L-8D
UE]; Joseph Young, Without Unified, Federal Regulations for Digital Currencies, the
U.S. Risks Falling Behind, BITcoIN MAG. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://bitcoin
magazine.com/articles/without-unified-federal-regulations-for-digital-currencies-
the-u-s-risks-falling-behind-1470086728 [http://perma.cc/7GNX-MY68].
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outcomes would still require isolating the role of credit ratings from all of the
various inputs into a given investment decision. 8 3
This is not to suggest that Congress should amend or scrap § 939A on the
basis of a hunch alone-which is to say, mine, rather than that of its propo-
nents. Instead, it is to recognize that causal claims in this area will always be
sketchy. If decisive data is a precondition for revising § 939A, its future is bright
indeed.
However, nor should Congress ignore what information is available. Recall
that the U.S. was not the only government that sought to reduce reliance on
credit ratings after the 2007 crisis. Pursuant to the recommendations of the FSB,
the EU has attempted similar reforms.'4 Although its experiences are also not
incontrovertible evidence for or against a given approach, and any lessons
drawn come with the caveat of mutatis mutandis, they do provide a basis for
comparison. The following Section focuses on the EU reforms in order to ask
whether strategies adopted across the Atlantic may indicate a path forward.
B. TheEUApproach
Two words in the FSB's First Principle underlie a key distinction between
the U.S. and EU's strategies for reducing reliance on credit ratings: "wherever
possible."15 As noted above, Congress did not include the phrase in Dodd-
Frank.'86 The EU favored a less demanding analogue-"where appropriate.""'
183. And one need not subscribe to legal realist claims to grant that investors, too, are
likely swayed as much by what they had for breakfast as purportedly objective in-
puts such as credit ratings. But see William W. Fisher III et al., Introduction, in
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM vi, xiv (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) ("The re-
alist credo is often caricatured as the proposition that how a judge decides a case
on a given day depends primarily on what he or she had for breakfast.").
184. For a review of post-crisis reforms planned or undertaken across the FSB's mem-
bership, see FIN. STABILITY BD., THEMATIC REVIEW ON FSB PRINCIPLES FOR
REDUCING RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS, Annex C (May 12, .2004),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_140512.pdf [http://perma.cc/EKE9-
YRBU].
185. In context: "Standard setters and authorities should assess references to credit rat-
ing agency ratings in standards, laws and regulations and, wherever possible, re-
move them or replace them by suitable alternative standards of creditworthiness."
FIN. STABILITY BD., PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCING RELIANCE, supra note 15, at 1 (em-
phasis added).
186. Note that Congress passed Dodd-Frank several months before the FSB published
its "Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings." Thus, the claim here is
not that Congress ignored international guidance.
187. In context: "Sectoral competent authorities in charge of supervising the entities
referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1) shall... assess the use of con-
tractual references to credit ratings and, where appropriate, encourage them to
mitigate the impact of such references, with a view to reducing sole and mechanis-
tic reliance on credit ratings...." Council Regulation 462/2013, art. 5a, O.J. (L
514
36:473 2018
CREDIT RATINGS, CONGRESS, AND MANDATORY SELF-RELIANCE
This Section contends that this two-word distinction is at the heart of a broader
divergence between the regulatory strategies adopted in the U.S. and EU.
"[W]herever possible" underpins an EU reform program that has been prag-
matic, humble, and open to experimentation. Such an approach may offer an
attractive and viable alternative to the categorical mandate of § 939A.
As an introduction to the EU's program for reducing reliance-and as an
indicator of the EU's comparative amenability to trial and error-note that the
EU's Credit Rating Agencies Regulation is currently in its third version. "CRA
III," passed in 2013, follows two prior versions of the regulation passed in De-
cember 2010 and May 2011. That the EU reform program is not "one and
done" no doubt partly reflects particular parliamentary procedures, political
conditions, and the independence of its regulatory authorities. Yet the distinc-
tion between the EU and U.S. has also been attitudinal. The recitals introducing
CRA III, for example, emphasize that although "[iln the medium term, further
action should be evaluated to delete references to credit ratings for regulatory
purposes from financial regulation . .. for the time being, credit rating agencies
are important participants in the financial markets."" The potential for
change-"for the time being"-and the need for adaptation in light of experi-
ence-"further action should be evaluated"-are central themes throughout
the text.
Article 5b of CRA III, "Reliance on credit ratings by the European Supervi-
sory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board," begins with a famil-
iarly categorical prohibition: "The European Supervisory Authorities [the Eu-
ropean Banking Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions
Authority, and European Securities and Markets Authority] shall not refer to
credit ratings in their guidelines, recommendations and draft technical stand-
ards..."'8 * "Shall not" is where § 939A of Dodd-Frank effectively concludes.
Article 5b, by contrast, goes on to relax the mandate with two preconditions to
the application of the prohibition. The first is purposive. The EU's categorical
"shall not" applies only "where such references have the potential to trigger sole
or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by the competent authorities, the sec-
toral competent authorities ... or other financial market participants."` 90 The
146) 13; see also id. art. 5b ("Accordingly, by 31 December 2013, EBA, EIOPA and
ESMA shall review and remove, where appropriate, all such references to credit
ratings in existing guidelines and recommendations.").
188. Id. recital 8 at 2.
189. Id. art. 5b at 13.
190. Id. Interestingly, the following clause denies similar discretion to the European
Systemic Risk Board (a body charged with macro-prudential oversight). Article
5b(2) instructs that "[t]he European Systemic Risk Board... shall not refer to
credit ratings in its warnings and recommendations where such references have
the potential to trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings." Id. Thus,
with regard to the presumptively highest risk components of financial regulation,
the EU adopted a categorical approach.
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second precondition is practical: the December 31 deadline for the Supervisory
Authorities to remove references to credit ratings applies only "where appropri-
ate."' 9 '
One might question the wisdom of imposing a mandatory "shall not refer
to credit ratings" only to undermine its compulsory force in the succeeding sen-
tences. The best response points to the U.S. experience-that is, to regulatory
implementation that upholds the letter but rarely the spirit of the provision. As
the SEC noted describing its revisions to the stress testing regime under rule 2a-
7, by not barring parties from continuing to consult credit ratings, "[the
amending provisions] will continue to promote effective stress testing while
implementing Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act." Put differently, the status
quo ante remains in place, but Congress cannot accuse us of noncompliance.
Consider two further provisions in CRA III that, while more directly ad-
dressing CRAs' conflicts of interest, demonstrate the EU's comparative amena-
bility to experimentation. First, Article 8d of CRA III seeks to mitigate conflicts
of interest by encouraging greater competition among CRAs. The impetus for
the measure is clear: in 2015, Moody's, Fitch, and S&P held 92.85% of the Eu-
ropean market for credit ratings.'92 Article 8d provides:
Where an issuer or a related third party intends to appoint at least two
credit rating agencies for the credit rating of the same issuance or enti-
ty, the issuer or a related third party shall consider appointing at least
one credit rating agency with no more than 10% of the total market
share, which can be evaluated by the issuer or a related third party as
capable of rating the relevant issuance or entity.193
The provision raises textual and practical concerns. Textually, the feeble
"shall consider" has all the hallmarks of industry lobbying during the drafting
191. Id.
192. EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., COMPETITION AND CHOICE IN THE CREDIT RATING
INDUSTRY 6 (Dec. 16, 2016) http://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
library/2016-1662 cramarketsharecalculation.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PLH
-X82D]. Their market share in the United States was 96.5%. See SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING
ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Dec. 2016). Note that industry concentration can cut both
ways. Supporting the EU's initiative, an oligopolistic market structure could exac-
erbate conflicts of interest if the few CRAs in the market become excessively def-
erential to and aligned with certain issuers. There are no real alternatives available,
hence it is in both parties' interests to keep a good thing going. Alternatively, ex-
panding competition could exacerbate conflicts of interest if new competition
leads to a race to the bottom, each CRA offering a higher (and more inaccurate)
rating than the other. A full analysis of these dynamics is beyond the scope of this
Note. Those seeking further information will be well served by ORG. ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND CREDIT RATINGAGENCIES (2010); EUR.
SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., COMPETITION AND CHOICE IN THE CREDIT RATING INDUSTRY
(Dec. 16, 2016). Thanks to the editors at YLPR for this insight.
193. Council Regulation 462/2013, art. 8d, O.J. (L146) 18.
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process. If the ambition was to mandate reference to a CRA with less market
share (provided that CRA is "capable of rating the relevant issuance or entity"),
then "shall" would have been adequate. Coupled with "consider," regulated
parties are merely obliged to think things over. Practically, as a 2015 report by
the European Commission notes, small CRAs "do not (as yet, at least) have suf-
ficient reputation among mainstream market participants for issuers to volun-
tarily choose them."'94 Investors may also not be able to utilize CRAs with less
market share due to stipulations in their investment mandates.'95 The central
point here, however, is not whether the proposal in article 8d is guaranteed to
succeed but rather how it illustrates the EU's willingness to consider alternative
and more nuanced solutions to the perceived ills of the CRA industry.
Second, Article 6b of CRA III stipulates that a CRA may only contract to
rate the re-securitizations of a given issuer for a maximum of four years. Ex-
cluding scenarios in which at least four CRAs rate more than ten percent of the
issuer's outstanding re-securitizations,96 or where the CRA falls below certain
revenue and headcount ceilings,'97 after four years the issuer will be required to
select a different CRA.
As explained in the regulation's recitals, mandatory CRA rotation should
mitigate the conflicts of interest associated with longstanding relationships be-
tween issuers and certain CRAs, diminish the "lock-in" effect, and facilitate the
entry of competitor CRAs into the market.'9' The recitals also acknowledge po-
tential concerns with the measure, including increased costs for issuers, dimin-
ished expertise among CRAs, and the potential for greater market volatility if
the new CRA assigns a different rating than its predecessor.'99 While the EU of
194. EUR. COMM'N, STUDY ON THE STATE OF THE CREDIT RATING
MARKET, MARKT/2014/257/F4/ST/OP, 8 (Jan. 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/
info/system/files/state-of-credit-rating-market-study-01012016_en.pdf [http://
perma.cc/ZB3T -YATJ].
195. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS 21 (Dec. 2013), http://www.sec.gov/
files/nrsroannrepl2l3.pdf [http://perma.cc/ANN9-7Q4L] (noting that a barrier to
entry for smaller CRAs is "the minimum ratings requirements specifying the rat-
ings of particular rating agencies in the investment management contracts of in-
stitutional fund managers. . ."). An IOSCO report likewise cites one fund manag-
er's investment agreement with a large pension fund. It stipulates, inter alia, that
"Securities must be rated either by S&P or Moody's." INT'L ORG. SEC.
COMM'Ns, GOOD PRACTICES ON REDUCING RELIANCE ON CRAs IN ASSET
MANAGEMENT 20 (June 2015), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD488.pdf [http://perma.cc/3K5K-8S7K].
196. Council Regulation 462/2013, supra note 187, art. 6b(2)(b) at 15.
197. Id. art. 6b(5) at 15.
198. Id. recital 11 at 3.
199. Id. recital 13 at 3-4.
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course expects that the provision's benefits exceed its costs, the recitals indicate
a remarkably frank acknowledgment of regulatory uncertainty.
Without wading into whether a U.S. regulator would be wise--or, as a mat-
ter of administrative law, permitted-to disclose such uncertainty, the distinc-
tion with U.S. practice is clear. It is difficult to imagine Dodd-Frank introduc-
ing an analogous reform, such as the public utility envisioned in § 939F, with
caveats such as "rotation of credit rating agencies could have a significant im-
pact on the quality and continuity of credit ratings.""oo To be fair, Section 939F
does call for a study of the proposed public utility, and instructs that the study
consider, inter alia, whether "the extent to which the creation of such a system
would be viewed as the creation of moral hazard by the Federal Govern-
ment."2 ' Yet just as soon as Congress acknowledged some regulatory uncer-
tainty, it foreclosed the outcome of its requested study, mandating that after the
submission of the study, the SEC "shall, by rule ... establish a system for the
assignment" of CRAs.2 0 2 There are clear reasons to question the wisdom of Arti-
cles 8d and 6b. My aim in presenting these measures is not to lobby the U.S.
Congress to adopt the initiatives verbatim so much as to prompt reflection on
its approach to CRA reform.
As a final example, the EU's recently adopted MMF regulation offers a use-
ful counterpoint to the preceding analysis of reforms to rule 2a-7 in the U.S.
Seizing on the flexibility of CRA III's "where appropriate," Article 20 of the
EU's MMF regulation eschews simple erasure of references to credit ratings,
stipulating that "Where a credit rating agency .. . has provided a rating ... the
manager of the MMF may have regard to such rating," provided that the man-
ager does not "solely or mechanistically rely[] on such rating."20 3
Taking a step back, one might argue that what the preceding paragraph de-
scribes as CRA III's "flexibility" is merely a positive reformulation of what pre-
vious portions of this Note criticized as "ambiguity." For example, mirroring
generic allusions to "minimal credit risks" in rule 2a-7, the MMF regulation of-
fers a similarly ill-defined standard of "solely or mechanistically."2 4 And much
like the 2013 Uniform Agreement between U.S. banking regulators that sought,
but largely failed, to clarify the term "investment grade,"2 03 the European Su-
200. Id. recital 13 at 3.
201. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 939F(b)(2)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1889 (2010).
202. Id. § 939F(d)(1) at 1889-90.
203. Council Regulation 2017/1131, art. 20(1), O.J. (L169) 30.
204. Indeed, in consultations prior to the passage of CRA III, the ECB echoed such
concerns, noting that because "the FSB itself did not provide any definition of
mechanistic reliance ... the ECB would recommend caution" in using the expres-
sion, "as this could prove difficult to apply." Opinion of the European Central
Bank on a Proposal for a Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, at
4, CON/2012/24 (Apr. 2, 2012).
205. See supra pp. 118-20.
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pervisory Authorities came together in 2014 in an attempt to define "sole or
mechanistic reliance." Their efforts appear equally inadequate: "there is sole or
mechanistic reliance on credit ratings (or credit rating outlooks) when an ac-
tion or omission is the consequence of any type of rule based on credit ratings
(or credit rating outlooks) without any discretion."206
An important distinction nonetheless remains that justifies the positive
connotations of "flexibility." The EU couples CRA III's rule ("shall not") with
an interpretive standard ("where appropriate"). What I have described as regu-
latory flexibility stems from this conjunction. Regulators in the U.S., by con-
trast, must comply with a rule alone ("remove any reference"), and as a result
have manufactured flexibility via facially compliant but functionally insignifi-
cant amending language.2 0 7 In sum, the EU approach affords regulators limited
discretion; the U.S. approach has induced regulatory bad faith-terms such as
"flexibility" and "ambiguity" connote the approval/censure appropriate to this
distinction.
To be clear, "fail fast" and "iterate or die" are mantras best left in Silicon
Valley. These principles should not-and given the strictures of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, likely cannot-apply to the regulation of private enterprises
that prize legal predictability. Yet nor should the U.S. accept a regulatory model
of "one and done." The EU's strategies for CRA reform suggest that text such as
"where appropriate" may afford the sort of bounded discretion for regulatory
innovation and candidness that § 939A's rigidity precludes. Even granting that
some of these distinctions reflect political constraints rather than diverging am-
bitions, the EU's approach deserves careful consideration.
C. An Alternative Path Forward
This Note joins a venerable line of scholarship in offering a great deal of
criticism and relatively few solutions. Articulating a menu of reforms for CRA
regulation is well beyond its scope and has been ably attempted elsewhere.20s
206. EUR. BANKING AUTH. ET AL., MECHANISTIC REFERENCES TO CREDIT RATINGS IN THE
ESAs' GUIDELINES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, JC 2014 004 at 8 (Feb. 6, 2014),
http://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Recommendations/JC_2014 004 _Final
ReportMechanistic ReferencestoCreditRatings-rect.pdf [http://perma.cc/
97NJ-8H25]. The causal analysis required by this definition merits the same cri-
tiques levied at § 939A in that it appears to require regulators to determine
whether an investor's "action or omission" stemmed from the inclusion of a cred-
it rating in a given rule. The "without any discretion" proviso arguably makes
non-compliant regulations easier to identify, but that will depend on how EU
regulatory authorities choose to construe the language.
207. That is, insignificant with reference to § 939A's ambitions. The provision may
very well be significant with regard to transaction costs and other unintended
consequences.
208. For a sample, see Coffee, supra note 43; Daniel Indiviglio, Three Suggestions for
Reforming Rating Agencies, THE ATLANTIC (June 19, 2009); and Alice M. Rivlin &
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This Section instead concludes by considering the path forward that may be
available if we drop the deference-afforded, albeit grudgingly thus far-to
Congress's diagnosis that investors and regulators have placed undue reliance
on CRAs. I do not claim that this diagnosis is incorrect so much as imprecise.
As a result of this imprecision, however, regulators have begun from an inaccu-
rate starting point and will rely upon a flawed foundation for future reforms.
Overreliance is an inaccurate starting point because it directs legislative and
regulatory attention toward a symptom rather than the underlying ill. To see
why, assume a market in which investors perform no due diligence whatsoever
aside from consulting the credit ratings of S&P, Fitch, and Moody's. If these
firms issue a high rating, or revise a rating upward, all investors in the market
buy. If they issue a low rating, or revise a rating downward, all investors in the
market sell. Investors' decision-making in this hypothetical market is mechani-
cal. To round out the picture, further assume that the investors' mechanistic
reliance on credit ratings is mandated by regulatory authorities. Reverse § 939A,
in other words, such that investors cannot perform their own due diligence and
their reliance upon CRAs is not just excessive but exclusive.
If we accept that the general ambition motivating Dodd-Frank's reforms to
CRA regulation roughly parallels the mission of the SEC-"to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital for-
mation"2 0 9 -what is wrong with this hypothetical market? In a word, nothing.
So long as the ratings are accurate, investors will be protected; markets will be
fair and orderly and efficient; and capital will be allocated to its most effective
user. So long as the ratings are accurate, the hypothetical market meets our reg-
ulatory ambitions.
A better targeted reform project, premised on a more precise diagnosis,
would therefore focus on ensuring that "so long as the ratings are accurate"
holds true. Reducing reliance on CRAs may indirectly advance that goal-for
example, perhaps striking the NRSRO standard from regulations will encourage
new CRAs to enter the market, allowing investors to more readily punish CRAs
when their ratings are inaccurate by moving business elsewhere-but it certain-
ly directs scarce regulatory attention away from CRAs and the quality of their
ratings. That is to say, away from the underlying ill.
Overreliance also establishes a flawed foundation for future regulatory re-
forms, first, because it is largely immune to measurement, and second, because
it leads to challenging (if not wholly impractical) efforts to mandate self-
reliance. Beginning with measurement, regulators cannot isolate the portion of
a given investment decision made pursuant to a credit rating. Even the EU's
more iterative model must ultimately rely on correlations and market surveys in
John B. Soroushian, Credit Rating Agency Reform is Incomplete, BROOKINGS (Mar.
6, 2017).
209. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, DRAFr STRATEGIC PLAN FISCAL YEARS 2014-2018, at 1
(2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/sec-strategic-plan-2014-20 18-draft.pdf [http://
perma.cc/26BG-3YUZ].
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order to assess whether its interventions have succeeded.'o Regulators began
the project of reducing reliance on credit ratings with little sense of the scope of
the problem; nearly a decade later, they have equally little sense of whether they
have addressed it or not.
Turning to mandating self-reliance, overreliance also provides a poor
foundation for reform because the public interventions that appear to follow
from it are, if not impracticable, at least highly unlikely to succeed. As indicated
at the outset of this Note, independence is not necessarily immune to instruc-
tion or cultivation. The efficiency and related arguments made throughout
nonetheless still apply: even if mandatory self-reliance is not an oxymoron, in-
formation- and expertise-intensive financial transactions appear uniquely ill-
suited to compulsory independence.2 n
What to do? A decade removed from the financial crisis, now appears an
opportune moment to reassess. The Trump Administration has called for a
general review of excessive regulation (and likely preordained the review's out-
come in describing it as such).m' The reassessment envisioned here is less con-
cerned with quantity than quality. It will strike no one as revolutionary. Policy
makers should simply ask whether, in their understandable haste to ward off the
next financial crisis, they developed measures likely to advance that end.
Of course, regulators aspire to greater things than avoiding catastrophe. Yet
the worst-case scenario provides an appropriate, and intentionally low, hurdle
for the reassessment envisioned here. Recall the question: does this measure aid
in warding off the next financial crisis? To the extent that the answer is "no,"
the appropriate response is obvious. To the extent that the answer is "maybe," it
is best to leave the regulation in place. Agencies have no choice but to regulate
against uncertainty 13 if their role is to be anything other than custodial (in the
sense of cleaning up messes that have already been made) and, given the diffi-
culty of devising and implementing any reform, a presumption in favor of
preservation appears appropriate. Finally, to the extent that the answer is "we
210. Succeeded in reducing reliance on CRAs in the first instance, but if one accepts
the preceding paragraph's analysis, then measuring success will require the even
more difficult determination of whether these measures have caused CRAs to
produce more accurate credit ratings.
211. Perhaps finance is not altogether unique, however. We might imagine a similar
provision in medicine. Following a spate of doctors providing unduly optimistic
assessments of their patients' health, Congress responds by mandating that regu-
lators strike all references to physicians, thereby compelling patients to rely less on
physicians' expertise. For everyone that does not hold shares in WebMD, the con-
sequences would be disastrous.
212. See Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential
-actions/presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-controlling-regulatory
-costs [http://perma.cc/F2MG-GV8L].
213. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search of the Law-Science
Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135 (2003).
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cannot know," the presumption should shift in favor of removing the provi-
sion.
CONCLUSION
Dodd-Frank's attempt to reduce regulators and investors' dependence on
credit ratings by mandating self-reliance vindicates two familiar ideals in U.S.
politics and law. On one hand are the (traditionally Conservative) rugged indi-
vidualists. They pull themselves up by their own bootstraps; seize their own
manifest destiny; and require no third-party support, public or private, to
achieve their ambitions. "That government is best which governs least,"214
summarizes adherents' outlook concerning the appropriate response to overre-
liance, and their school of thought thus looks favorably on any attempt to stim-
ulate independence from third parties. Section 939A appears to fit the bill.
On the other hand is an equally lauded (traditionally Liberal) ideal of pub-
lic authority in which government can and should intervene in the private sec-
tor in order to mitigate negative externalities; or, failing that, compel private
actors to internalize such costs. This perspective envisions a robust role for gov-
ernment in preventing the financial crises that rugged individualists consistently
create when left to their own devices. Section 939A appeals just as directly to
this ideal.
Dodd-Frank § 939A thus appears to combine two lauded visions of public-
private interaction under a banner of "mandatory self-reliance." As a targeted
critique of Dodd-Frank, this Note contends that, even assuming the wisdom of
the project, § 939A is unlikely to achieve Congress's aims. As a broader com-
ment on securities law, it argues that investors should not be compelled to go it
alone.
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